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THE MARKET POWER MODEL OF CONTRACT 
FORMATION: HOW OUTMODED ECONOMIC 
THEORY STILL DISTORTS 
ANTITRUST DOCTRINE 
Alan J Meese* 
Transaction cost economics ("TCE") has radically altered industrial 
organization's explanation for so-called "non-standard contracts, " including 
"exclusionary " agreements that exclude rivals from access to inputs or cus-
tomers. According to TCE, such integration usually reduces transaction 
costs without producing anticompetitive harm. TCE has accordingly exer-
cised growing influence over antitrust doctrine, with courts invoking TCE's 
teachings to justify revision of some doctrines once hostile to such contracts. 
Still, old habits die hard, even for courts of increasing economic sophistica-
tion. This Article critiques one such habit, namely, courts' continuing claim 
that firms use market or monopoly power to impose exclusionary contracts on 
unwilling trading partners. In so doing, the Article takes issue with both the 
Harvard and Chicago Schools of Antitrust, normally seen as antagonists, 
each of which has erroneously embraced the "market power" model of contract 
formation. 
For the last several decades, courts have premised particular rules of 
antitrust liability upon the assumption that firms used preexisting market 
power to "coerce" or 'Jorce" trading partners to enter exclusionary agree-
ments. Most notably, courts have held that a monopolist's use of such power 
to obtain an exclusionary agreement violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, with-
out any additional showing that the agreement produced economic harm. 
Following similar logic, courts enforcing § 1 of the Act have banned tying 
agreements obtained by firms with market power, reasoning that sellers used 
their power to 'Jorce" buyers to enter such contracts. Finally, courts have 
invoked the market power model when holding that dealers or consumers can 
challenge unlawful agreements they have themselves entered and enforced, 
© 2013 AlanJ. Meese. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and 
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contrary to the common law doctrine ofin pari delicto ("in equal fault"). 
Courts have reasoned that plaintiffs' participation in such contracts is invol-
untary, because defendants use maiket power to impose them. While modern 
courts sometimes consider evidence that such agreements produce benefits, 
they nonetheless assume that sellers employ market power to impose them and 
treat such coercive imposition as a harm coexisting with any efficiencies. 
These doctrines survive to this day, along with the market power model 
of contract formation, despite courts ' increasing economic sophistication. 
This Article locates the origin of these doctrines and the maiket power model 
in price theory's workable competiti(m model, often associated with the 
"Harvard School" of Antitrust. Assumptions informing the workable compe-
tition model excluded the possibility that exclusionary agreements produced 
benefits, giving rise to the natural inference that firms with market power 
imposed such contracts against the will of trading partners. Courts 
embraced this account of these agreements and announced hostile doctrines 
resting upon the assumption that such contracts were expressions of market 
power "used" to impose them. While Chicago School scholars questioned 
these doctrines, their critique ironically rested upon a more precise price-theo-
retic account of how firms purportedly used market power to impose these 
agreements. 
In the past few decades, TCE has emerged as a competing paradigm for 
evaluating non-standard contracts. Building on the work of Ronald Coase, 
practitioners of TCE argued that many such contracts, including those that 
"exclude" rivals, can reduce the cost of transacting, particularly anticipated 
costs of opportunism made possible by relationship-specific investments. 
While most practitioners of TCE have ignored the means by which such con-
tracts are formed, Coase himself once indicated that such integration was 
"voluntary, " albeit without elaboration. This Article elaborates on prior 
work by the author and others showing that firms can induce voluntary 
acceptance of these provisions by offering cost-justified discounts to trading 
partners who agree to them, thereby using the institution of contract to rede-
fine background rights and obligations so as to minimize transaction costs. 
While courts have sometimes invoked TCE's beneficial characterization of 
such agreements, they have not recognized the implication, examined here, 
that such contracts are purely voluntary, clinging instead to the decades-old 
conclusion that firms use preexisting market power to impose them. 
TCE does not teach that all non-standard agreements reduce transac-
tion costs. Moreover, parallel developments suggest that some such agree-
ments may reduce economic welfare by raising rivals' costs and conferring 
maiket power. Here again, however, there is no reason to believe that propo-
nents of such agreements use market power to impose them. Instead, propo-
nents can induce input suppliers to enter such contracts voluntarily, simply 
Uy sharing with them expected monopoly profits the arrangements will help 
create. Thus, such agreements are no more "coercive" than ordinary cartel 
arrangements. 
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The Article ends by exploring implications of these insights for antitrust 
doctrine. First, courts should discard substantive antitrust doctrines that 
depend upon the "market power" model of contract formation in Javor of 
more direct analysis of the economic impact of challenged practices. This 
admonition cuts both ways. On the one hand, plaintiffs should not prevail 
or establish a prima facie case in monopolization or tying litigation simply by 
showing that a firm with power has "imposed" an exclusionary agreement. 
At the same time, recognition that voluntary exclusionary rights agreements 
can produce anticompetitive harm undermines the Chicago School claim that 
failure to establish preexisting market power should doom challenges to ties 
and other agreements scrutinized under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Second, 
and in the same vein, courts should reject any effort to infer the existence of 
such power from the presence of non-standard agreements, because the pres-
ence of such agreements is at least equally consistent with a conclusion that 
they are the result of harmless voluntary integration. Third, courts should 
discard exceptions to the in pari delicto doctrine based on the "market 
power" model of contract formation and reconsider current law allowing 
dealers and consumers to challenge agreements they have voluntarily entered. 
INTRODUCTION 
More than a generation ago industrial organization witnessed a 
scientific revolution in the form of transaction cost economics (TCE). 
The transaction cost approach offered a radically different interpreta-
tion of various forms of contractual integration that economists and 
judges had previously condemned as anticompetitive. In particular, 
proponents of this new approach provided explanations for non-stan-
dard agreements, which constrained dealers or customers after a sale. 
These scholars contended that, while apparently anticompetitive, such 
agreements in fact often minimized the costs of relying upon an oth-
erwise atomistic market to conduct economic activity and thereby 
enhanced economic welfare. 
Not surprisingly, TCE has exerted a growing influence on anti-
trust doctrine over the past few decades, with courts invoking its bene-
ficial account of various non-standard agreements to justify revision of 
doctrines once hostile to such contracts. Still, old habits die hard, 
even when courts of increasing economic sophistication articulate 
antitrust doctrine. This Article identifies and critiques one such habit, 
namely, the propensity of courts to characterize certain agreements as 
expressions of market or monopoly power "used" to impose contracts 
on unwilling trading partners. This habit, it will be shown, originated 
in neoclassical price theory, which two schools of antitrust thought 
ordinarily viewed as antagonists-Harvard and Chicago-embraced as 
a methodology for understanding how such agreements are formed. 
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For the last several decades, beginning in antitrust law's "inhospi-
tality era," courts have premised particular rules of liability upon the 
assumption that firms with market power used that power to "coerce" 
or "force" trading partners to enter certain contracts, particularly con-
tracts excluding rivals from portions of the market. Most notably, 
courts have held that a II_lOnopolist that "used" its power to obtain an 
exclusionary agreement thereby violated § 2 of the Sherman Act, with-
out any additional showing that the agreement produced economic 
harm. Following similar logic, courts enforcing § 1 of the Act banned 
all tying agreements obtained by firms with the slightest market 
power, reasoning that sellers used their power to "force" buyers to 
enter such contracts. Like the "use" of monopoly power to impose 
exclusionary agreements, such "forcing" was unlawful per se, without 
any additional proof of harm. 
The market power model of contract formation did more than 
influence substantive antitrust doctrine. The model also helped 
courts decide who can challenge unlawful conduct. In particular, 
courts have held that dealers or consumers can challenge unlawful 
agreements they have themselves entered and enforced. Although 
the common law doctrine of in pari delicto ("in equal fault") ordinarily 
prevented parties from challenging agreements they had helped 
negotiate, courts declined to invoke this bar, reasoning that participa-
tion by consumers and dealers in such contracts was involuntary, 
because manufacturers had used market power to impose such agree-
ments against plaintiffs' will. Courts even applied this logic to non-
exclusionary agreements such as resale price maintenance, which 
raised the prices dealers could charge consumers. 
Applying the teachings of TCE, courts have modified or aban-
doned many doctrines announced during the inhospitality era. None-
theless, doctrines based upon the market power model of contract 
formation survive to this day. For instance, the Supreme Court's most 
recent treatment of exclusionary contracts reiterates both the "abuse 
of power" test under § 2 and § 1 's per se rule against ties supposedly 
"forced" on purchasers. Lower courts have followed suit, with some 
even suggesting that conduct excluding rivals from the marketplace 
itself implies the existence of market power. At the same time, courts 
have reiterated their conclusion that dealers or consumers may chal-
lenge exclusionary agreements in which they have participated if they 
were "forced" or "coerced" to enter such contracts, a showing made 
whenever the defendant possesses sufficient power to establish the 
underlying offense. 
This Article critiques the "market power" account of contract for-
mation and the various doctrines the account informs. This account, 
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it is shown, rests on neoclassical price theory's workable competition 
model. Scholars applying the workable competition model, particu-
larly those in the so-called Harvard School of antitrust policy, drew a 
distinction between unilateral "competition on the merits," on the 
one hand, which could result in monopoly, and the purported use of 
such market power to exclude rivals, on the other. These scholars 
argued that antitrust law should not interdict the use of monopoly or 
market power achieved via legitimate competition to impose high 
prices, but should instead ban the use of such power to exclude rivals, 
and antitrust doctrine reflected this distinction. 
The same scholars also viewed non-standard contracts as unjusti-
fied departures from the sort of "perfect competition" that presump-
tively produces a welfare-maximizing allocation of resources. Because 
such contracts produced no apparent benefits, there was no reason to 
conclude that dealers or consumers entered them voluntarily. Most 
real world firms possess some market power, no matter how slight, 
and members of the workable competition school naturally concluded 
that firms used that power to coerce acceptance of such agreements. 
Thus, these scholars concluded that such agreements were not "com-
petition on the merits" but instead reflected the use of power to 
exclude rivals, and antitrust doctrine predictably condemned such 
agreements along with other non-standard provisions during anti-
trust's inhospitality era. While some scholars, particularly from the 
"Chicago School," questioned these doctrinal results, their critique 
ironically rested upon a more precise account, also drawn from price 
theory, of the market power model than scholars invoking the worka-
ble competition model had offered. Price theory, and not other influ-
ences such as Legal Realism, accounted for legal doctrines resting 
upon the market power model of contract formation. 
Price theory is not the only economic framework that purports to 
explain the origin and formation of non-standard contracts. During 
the last few decades of the twentieth century, so-called Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) emerged as a competing paradigm for evaluat-
ing non-standard agreements in the form of complete or partial inte-
gration. Ronald Coase initiated the transaction cost revolution by 
arguing that complete vertical integration could reduce the cost of 
transacting, that is, relying upon atomistic markets to conduct eco-
nomic activity. Building on Coase's work, other practitioners of TCE 
argued that many non-standard contracts, including those that 
"exclude" rivals, can also reduce the cost of transacting, particularly 
anticipated costs of opportunism made possible by relationship-spe-
cific investments. In particular, such agreements could create the eco-
nomic equivalent of property rights and thereby prevent some actors 
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from free riding on the productive activities of others. While most 
practitioners of TCE had ignored the means by which such contracts 
were formed, Coase himself had argued that such integration was "vol-
untary," albeit without explaining just how, exactly, proponents of 
such contracts induced trading partners to enter them. As this Article 
shows, firms can induce voluntary acceptance of these provisions by 
offering costjustified discounts to trading partners who agree to 
them, thereby using the institution of contract to redefine back-
ground rights and obligations so as to minimize the cost of con-
ducting economic activity. 
TCE does not teach that all non-standard agreements reduce 
transaction costs. Moreover, parallel developments suggest that some 
such agreements may, under certain restrictive conditions, reduce 
economic welfare by raising the costs of a firm's rivals, thereby 
allowing the proponent of the agreement to exercise market power. 
Here again, however, there is no reason to believe that proponents of 
such agreements use market power to impose them. Instead, propo-
nents can induce input suppliers to enter such contracts voluntarily, 
simply by sharing with them expected monopoly profits the arrange-
ments will help create. Thus, such agreements no more result from 
"coercion" than ordinary cartel arrangements. 
Part I of this Article outlines how the "market power" model of 
contract formation has influenced and still influences various aspects 
of antitrust doctrine. Examples of doctrine reflecting such influence 
include the "use of power" test applied to claims of monopolization 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act, the per se rule against certain tying 
contracts derived from § 1 of the Sherman Act, and judicial hostility 
to the supposed use of power, including discriminatory pricing, to 
"impose" agreements analogous to ties. Finally, the model also 
informs and limits the scope of the in pari delicto defense recognized at 
common law, empowering dealers to challenge various agreements, 
whether or not "exclusionary," they knowingly entered, on the ground 
that any such agreement was not voluntary. 
Part II concludes that the "market power" model is a manifesta-
tion of neoclassical price theory and its workable competition model, 
economic frameworks that dominated industrial organization for 
much of the twentieth century. While Chicago School scholars (as 
usual) took issue with the doctrinal conclusions reached by courts and 
the Harvard School, they aweed with Harvard scholars that firms 
employed market power to impose such agreements and in fact 
offered a more precise account of what such imposition entailed. 
This Part ends by explaining that price theory, and not Legal Realism, 
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accounts for the market power model of contract formation and deriv-
ative antitrust doctrines. 
Part III reviews TCE's critique of workable competition's account 
of non-standard contracts. According to TCE, such agreements usu-
ally have nothing to do with monopoly power, but are instead meth-
ods of reducing the "transaction costs" that atomistic rivalry would 
entail. While TCE's insights have significantly influenced antitrust law 
and policy, doctrines based on the market power model of contract 
formation remain firmly intact. This Part then offers a model of con-
tract formation different from that embraced by the Harvard and Chi-
cago Schools, derived from TCE and Ronald Coase's work on the 
voluntary reallocation of property rights. This "Coasean bargain" 
model, it is shown, suggests that contracts that reduce transaction 
costs by preventing opportunism are voluntary redefinitions of prop-
erty rights and not imposed via market power. This part extends this 
"Coasean bargain" model to explain agreements that "raise rivals' 
costs" and thus confer market power on the proponent of the agree-
ment. Like agreements that reduce transaction costs, such contracts 
are best understood as purely voluntary reallocations of property 
rights ordinarily allocated by law to input suppliers. 
Part IV explores some implications of this Article's insights for 
antitrust doctrine. First, this Part argues that substantive antitrust doc-
trines of monopolization and tying that depend upon the "market 
power" model of contract formation rest upon outmoded economic 
theory and should be discarded in favor of more direct analysis of the 
economic impact of challenged practices. This admonition cuts both 
ways. On the one hand, plaintiffs should not prevail or even establish 
a prima facie case in a monopolization or tying case simply by showing 
that a firm with power has "imposed" an exclusionary agreement. At 
the same time, recognition that voluntary exclusionary rights agree-
ments can produce anticompetitive harm undermines those opin-
ions-endorsed by members of the Chicago School-holding that the 
possession of preexisting market power is a necessary condition for 
antitrust liability under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Second, and in the 
same vein, courts should reject any effort to infer the existence of 
such power from the presence of non-standard agreements, since the 
presence of such agreements is at least equally consistent with a con-
clusion that they are the result of harmless voluntary integration. 
Third, courts considering assertions of the in pari delicto defense 
should abandon the assumption that manufacturers "force" dealers 
and consumers to accept provisions that reduce transaction costs or 
raise rivals' costs, given the Coasean paradigm's conclusion that man-
ufacturers will share the fruits of such agreements with input owners. 
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Thus, courts should discard exceptions to the in pari delicto doctrine 
based on the "market power" model of contract formation and recon-
sider current doctrines allowing dealers and consumers to challenge 
agreements they have entered. 
I. MARKET PoWER A.No CoNTRACT FoRMATION IN THE CouRTS 
Various antitrust doctrines rest upon the assumption that firms 
with market power "use" that power to impose "exclusionary agree-
ments" upon unwilling dealers or consumers. This Part examines 
these doctrines in greater detail, beginning with a careful examina-
tion of the role of the "market power" account in the law of monopoli-
zation, where this model has had particular influence. 
A. Monopolization 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids "monopolizing" "any part of 
the trade or commerce among the several States[.]"1 From the begin-
ning, courts have held that § 2 does not forbid the mere possession of 
monopoly, viz., "monopoly in the concrete."2 Instead, the Act only 
forbids the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly by conduct not 
deemed "normal" or "ordinary."3 
Courts have adhered to this fundamental construction of the Act, 
consistently holding that plaintiffs invoking § 2 must establish some 
undesirable conduct in addition to possession of a monopoly. 4 While 
courts have expressed and implemented this overarching standard in 
a variety of ways, one formulation has been surprisingly persistent, 
serving as a template for evaluating monopolization claims for over 
sixty years. Under this "abuse of power" test, the offense of monopoli-
1 15 u.s.c. § 2 (2006). 
2 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (holding that the 
Shennan Act forbids only unreasonable restraints of trade and does not forbid 
"monopoly in the concrete"); see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 
U.S. 32 (1918) (holding that§ 2 only forbids "unusual" or "wrongful" acts that result 
in or protect monopoly); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 178-81 
(1911) (holding that § 2 only forbids acts which "unduly" create or protect 
monopoly). 
3 See Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 178-79; Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 178-81; see 
also United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. at 63-65 (rejecting attack on contracts that disad-
vantaged rivals because the agreements were normal and served legitimate purposes). 
4 See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Aspen 
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. 
Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (per curiam). 
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zation consists of two elements: ( 1) the possession of monopoly power 
and (2) the "use or exercise of that power" to exclude or destroy com-
petition.5 Moreover, in a seemingly circular approach, courts that 
invoke this formulation define "monopoly power"-at least rhetori-
cally-as the power "to control prices or exclude competition."6 
5 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481 (noting that the first element of the 
test is "possession of monopoly power"); id. at 482-483 ("The second element of a § 2 
claim is the use of monopoly power 'to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive 
advantage, or to destroy a competitor."' (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 
100, 107 (1948))); Lorain journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951)); Griffith, 
334 U.S. at 107; LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 F. App'x 554 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Smith Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 F. App'x 398 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 931 (6th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 186-91 (3d Cir. 2005); Borden, Inc. v. Fed. 
Trade Comm'n, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 603 F.2d 263, 271-74 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 
F. 3d 302, 316-17 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that allegation that "Microsoft's use of its 
monopoly power in the operating-system market to foreclose the distribution chan-
nels for [plaintiff's] applications" established antitrust standing); id. at 316 (recount-
ing allegation that "Microsoft exploited its monopoly power to require or encourage 
OEMs to refrain from installing [plaintiff's] products on their computers"); id. at 309 
(recounting allegation that Microsoft used "leverage" to "impose restrictive and exclu-
sionary agreements"); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (finding that contractual restrictions on original equipment manufacturers 
were a "use[] of Microsoft's market power to protect its monopoly"); Brief for the 
United States of America and Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 13-14, Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 
540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682), 2003 WL 21269559, at *13-*14 (invoking this test); 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 730, 736-38 (1980). 
As noted in the text, courts sometimes apply a different test, banning "the willful 
acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident." Compare Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 595-96 & n.19 (quoting Grinnell Corp., 
384 U.S. at 570-71), with id. at 595 (quoting with approval jury instruction that also 
banned the "use" of monopoly power), and id. at 597-98 (same). For another exam-
ple, see Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 782 (6th Cir. 2002) (con-
demning "willful acquisition, maintenance or use of [monopoly] power by anti-
competitive or exclusionary means"). As explained below, even courts employing this 
formulation sometimes rely upon a "market power" account of exclusionary contracts 
when condemning a monopolist for, say, "willful maintenance" of its power. See, e.g., 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 578 (describing five year leases as imbued with "coercive 
power ... towards restraining trade and creating a monopoly" and thus conduct that 
violated § 2); see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 597-98 (quoting with approval lower 
court instructions stating that "taking advantage of scale economies by constructing a 
large and efficient factory ... [constitutes] a consequences of size and not an exercise 
of monopoly power" and thus does not violate § 2). 
6 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding 
that plaintiffs had adduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defen-
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Thus, by the terms of the test, at least, "exclusion of competition" can 
establish both the presence of monopoly power and the second, con-
duct element as well. Moreover, even some courts that do not 
expressly invoke the abuse of power standard for liability purposes 
nonetheless define monopoly power in this manner. 7 Indeed, the 
most recent § 2 complaint filed by the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice alleges that a defendant "abused its monopoly 
power ... through its exclusionary contracts" and that "[e]ach exclu-
sionary contract" entailed willful exploitation of that power.8 
If taken literally, the abuse of power test would sweep very 
broadly. Mter all, all sorts of conduct harms rivals and "excludes" 
competitors from the marketplace, thus "excluding competition" 
within the plain meaning of the test. A firm that makes the proverbial 
"better mousetrap" excludes firms making mediocre ones.9 Similarly, 
a firm that realizes economies of scale and underprices rivals 
"excludes" less efficient firms. 10 
Nonetheless, the abuse of power test has never condemned this 
sort of normal business conduct. To be sure, there is dicta in some 
recent opinions treating these forms of exclusion as evidence the 
"excluding" firm possess monopoly power.l 1 However, courts gener-
dant could "control prices or exclude competition" and thus possessed monopoly 
power in the relevant market); see Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 596 n.20 (invoking jury's 
finding that the defendant possessed monopoly power, defined as the power to con-
trol prices in the relevant market or to exclude competitors); Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 
at 571 ("(M]onopoly power [is] 'the power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion."' (quoting United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 
(1954))); Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187; PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101 (2d 
Cir. 2002); Conwood Co., 290 F.3d at 782; Covad Commc'ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 
299 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 
51 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 
2000); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 272. 
7 See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 596; Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571; Conwood Co., 
290 F.3d at 782. 
8 Complaint at 26, n 83-84, United States v. United Reg' I Health Care Sys., No. 
7:11-cv-00030 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011). 
9 See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REv. 253, 
264 (2003) (invoking this example). 
10 See HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST Poucv 553 (2d ed. 1999) 
("Nothing is a more effective barrier to entry than a firm's capacity to produce a high 
quality product at a low price, or to provide improved service to its consumers."); 
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Identifying Monopolists' Illegal Conduct Under the Shennan Act, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 818 (2000) (collecting scholar commentary and evidence sug-
gesting that firms achieve monopoly power by offering superior products and/ or real-
izing efficiencies). 
11 See Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 187 (" (M]onopoly power ... has been defined as the 
ability to control prices or exclude competition . . . . However, because such evidence 
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ally ascertain the presence or absence of monopoly power by defining 
the relevant market and calculating the defendant's market share.12 
Moreover, a high market share does not itself establish monopoly 
power if other firms would readily enter the relevant market if the 
defendant charged supracompetitive prices. 13 In short, under the 
"abuse of power" test, the monopoly power element "stands on its own 
two feet" and involves an independent assessment of the defendant's 
power based upon the structure of the relevant market. 
In addition, mere proof that a monopolist's conduct literally 
"excludes" rivals from some portion of the market, or even the entire 
market, has never satisfied the second element of any § 2 test. 
Instead, courts have repeatedly held that the creation of a new prod-
uct, realization of economies of scale and resulting low, above-cost 
prices and similar conduct all constitute "competition on the mer-
its."14 Such merits-based rivalry, it is said, does not constitute an "exer-
is only rarely available, courts more typically examine market structure in search of 
circumstantial evidence of monopoly power." (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (suggesting in dicta 
that direct proof of anticompetitive impact could suffice to establish monopoly power 
under § 2). The implication of these dicta seems to be that mere proof of anticompe-
titive impact, including perhaps the exclusion of rivals, would itself suffice to establish 
monopoly power. 
12 See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992); 
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Dentsply, 399 
F.3d at 187. 
13 See United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding, 
absent barriers to entry, high market share does not establish market power); see also 
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51 (holding presence of entry barriers necessary to a finding that 
defendant possesses monopoly power). 
14 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 
(1993) (holding above-cost pricing is "competition on the merits" even if it drives 
inefficient rivals out of business); At!. Richfield v. USA Petroleum, 495 U.S. 328, 331 
(1990) (holding above-cost pricing cannot cause "antitrust injury"); Aspen Skiing Co. 
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96 (1985) (approving jury 
instruction stating that monopolists may enjoy economies of scale without incurring 
antitrust liability); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 
2002) (citing Aspen Skiing for the same proposition); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,274-75,281-82 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding economies of scale 
or technological innovations cannot violate § 2); id. at 276-85 (rejecting claim that 
Kodak's invention of new camera and failure to disclose invention to rivals contra-
vened§ 2); see also United States v. Nat'! Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 359 (1947) (rejecting 
decree requiring defendants to share technical know-how with competitors); United 
States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-45 (D. Mass. 1953) (distin-
guishing between "competition based on pure merit," on the one hand, and unlawful 
exclusion on the other); id. at 343-45 (concluding that internal conduct conforming 
to "inevitable economic laws" is not "exclusionary" under § 2); E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 746-51 (1980) (holding that failure to license propri-
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cise" of monopoly power, even if derived from gigantic scale that 
creates monopoly power in the first place. 15 Moreover, courts have 
recognized that any safe harbor for "competition on the merits" 
entails a concomitant right to refuse to sell one's high quality or inex-
pensive product to rivals. 16 
The paradigm case of "using" power to exclude rivals involves the 
supposed imposition of an exclusionary agreement on unwilling deal-
ers or consumers. Indeed, the Supreme Court invoked the "abuse of 
power" test in its most recent decision examining alleged contractual 
exclusion by a monopolist, 17 as have various lower courts. 18 Examples 
include tying agreements,19 exclusive dealing contracts,20 and other 
agreements by dealers or consumers not to deal with rivals.21 Moreo-
ver, even courts that do not expressly invoke the "abuse of power" test 
nonetheless sometimes rely upon the assertion that a monopolist 
etary technology was not unlawful exclusion, although it prevented entry of competi-
tors); Alan]. Meese, Monopolization, Axclusion and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. 
REv. 743, 797-808 (2005) [hereinafter Meese, Monopolization] (describing the origin 
of judicial preference for "competition on the merits"). 
15 See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274-75 (distinguishing between economies of 
scale, which are a "consequence of size," on the one hand, and exercises of market 
power, on the other); id. at 272-76 (explaining with great precision the distinction 
between possession and exercise of monopoly power). 
16 See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004) ("The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short 
period-is what attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that 
produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, 
the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompa-
nied by an element of anticompetitive conduct."); Nat'l Lead, 332 U.S. at 359; Berkey 
Photo, 603 F.2d at 281; E.J. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. at 746-51. 
17 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-86. 
18 See infra note 57. 
19 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-86; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 
F.3d 34, 60-64 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302, 
316 (4th Cir. 2007) (characterizing such agreements as "exploit[ation] [of 
Microsoft's] monopoly power to require or encourage OEMs to refrain from install-
ing Novell's products"); id. at 309 (referring to use of"leverage ... to impose restric-
tive and exclusionary agreements"); DSM Desotech, Inc. v. 3d Sys. Corp., No. 08-CV-
1531, 2009 WL 174989, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2009) (invoking "use of power" test 
when evaluating alleged attempted monopolization via tying). 
20 See United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2005) (hold-
ing that monopolist "exert[ed]" its power to foreclose competition via exclusive deal-
ing contracts imposed on dealers). 
21 See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. 
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 103-108 (1948) (holding that theaters "employ[]" their 
monopoly power as a "trade weapon" to induce film distributors to agree not to sup-
ply films to rival theaters). 
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"used" monopoly power to impose such a contract when concluding 
that the firm violates § 2.22 
Because courts only purport to ban exercises of power that 
"exclude competition," the "abuse of power" test leaves the most obvi-
ous exercises of monopoly power unscathed.23 That is to say, under 
this test (and current law), monopolists may exercise the full extent of 
their power the "old-fashioned way" by charging above-cost prices.24 
While such monopoly prices arguably injure consumers, they do not 
"exclude competition." If anything, such high prices and the reduced 
output that causes them will enhance competition, by leaving room in 
the marketplace for new entrants and protecting less efficient, smaller 
incumbents. 25 
The "abuse of power" test thus divides a monopolist's behavior 
into three categories: ( 1) "normal" conduct, which does not involve 
an "exercise" of monopoly power, but which may create or help main-
tain such power; (2) "legitimate" exercises of monopoly power, i.e., 
output reductions and price increases, and (3) unlawful, illegitimate 
exercises of such power, that is, exclusionary contracts and other exer-
cises of power that disadvantage rivals. 26 Conduct in the first cate-
gory-competition on the merits-does not offend § 2, even if it 
creates or maintains monopoly. Moreover, firms may employ legiti-
mately-gained power by charging whatever the market will bear, and 
the prospect of such profits creates incentives to engage in "competi-
tion on the merits."27 At the same time, firms may not employ power, 
however gained, to impose agreements that disadvantage rivals. 28 
22 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 578 (1966) (holding that 
monopolist's lease-only policy was "coercive" exclusionary conduct); United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that contractual conditions 
applied to PC manufacturers were a "use" of monopoly power). See generally Meese, 
Monopolization, supra note 14, at 755-771 (discussing the evolution of monopoly juris-
prudence under § 2). 
23 See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. 
24 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979). 
25 See id. at 274 n.12 ("Nor is a lawful monopolist ordinarily precluded from 
charging as high a price for its product as the market will accept. True, this is a use of 
economic power; indeed, the differential between price and marginal cost is used as 
an indication of the degree of monopoly power . . . . But high prices, far from damag-
ing competition, invite new competitors into the monopolized market." (citations 
omitted)). 
26 See supra notes 5-7. 
27 See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281. 
28 See Meese, Monopolization, supra note 14, at 755-62; William Page, Legal Realism 
and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY LJ. 1, 27-29 (1995) [hereinafter Page, 
Legal Realism] (describing role played by concept of "coercion" in various antitrust 
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Thus, antitrust doctrine tolerates one exercise of monopoly power, 
but bans the purported expression of such power to impose exclusion-
ary agreements. 
The taxonomy outlined above once functioned as a per se rule 
against exclusionary contracts entered by monopolists, as courts dis-
missed arguments that such agreements produced benefits justifying 
their exclusionary impact.29 More recently, however, courts have 
rejected this per se approach, further narrowing the category of con-
duct that § 2 prohibits. Thus even if a plaintiff demonstrates that a 
monopolist's exclusionary agreements disadvantage rivals, courts will 
allow defendants to show that such agreements produce significant 
benefits and thereby avoid condemnation.30 Even if the defendant 
adduces evidence that the restriction produces significant benefits, 
however, the plaintiff can still prevail by showing that the defendant 
could achieve these same benefits via a less restrictive alternative.B1 
When a monopolist cannot justify its agreement, courts conclude that 
doctrines during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s). While Professor Page very ably 
describes how concerns over supposed "coercion" influenced antitrust doctrine dur-
ing the Warren Court era and before, he does not articulate any model of contract 
formation consistent with this view or ascertain the role that price theory played in 
informing that model. Nor does he recognize the role the Chicago School played in 
actually buttressing and elaborating the market power model of contract formation. 
See infra notes 72, 169, 172, 178, 181-182 and accompanying text. 
29 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 578 (1966); see also United 
States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343-45 (D. Mass. 1953) (banning 
conditional leases and tying agreements entered by a monopolist without considering 
possible benefits of such arrangements). 
30 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 483 
( 1992) (holding that once plaintiff shows that agreements foreclose rivals from a por-
tion of the market, "[l]iability turns, then, on whether 'valid business reasons' can 
explain [defendant]'s actions" (quoting Apsen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985))); United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 
196-97 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant's proffered business justification was 
pretextual); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(reciting business justification defense to prima facie case); see also Berkey Photo, 603 
F.2d at 284 (holding that otherwise anticompetitive refusal to share technology can be 
justified by "valid business policy"); id. at 283 (finding that particular tactic dis-
advantaging rivals was "solely a benefit of integration and not, without more, a use of 
Kodak's power in the film market"). 
31 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 484-86 (rejecting defendant's summary 
judgment motion where plaintiff adduced evidence that the defendant could have 
achieved legitimate objectives without restrictive agreements); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 
58-59 (articulating this test). 
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it has employed preexisting monopoly power to exclude competition 
and maintain its monopoly.32 
While this modified test is more generous to defendants than it 
once was, it still rests upon an assumption that even beneficial agree-
ments produce harms that co-exist with any benefits. Mter all, the 
search for a "less restrictive" means of achieving a monopolist's objec-
tive depends upon an assumption that the restraint is "restrictive" in 
some meaningful sense.33 Since the abuse of power test does not 
require a showing that the restraint produces actual harm, the test 
must rest upon an assumption that, despite any benefits, the restraint 
is nonetheless the result of market power used to impose it. Courts 
that recognize that such restraints may produce benefits have not 
offered any alternative account of how such contracts are formed. 
B. Tying 
Courts have relied upon a similar test when analyzing so-called 
"tying contracts," under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Such agreements 
require buyers to purchase a second, tied product as a condition of 
receiving the first, tying product.34 The quintessential example 
involves a franchise contract granting a franchise-a tying product-
in return for an agreement by the franchisee also to purchase inputs 
such as spices or sauces from the franchisor. 35 
For decades now, many ties have been unlawful per se.36 In par-
ticular, such agreements are unlawful without more if the seller pos-
sesses "economic power" in the market for the tying product and 
requires buyers to purchase the tied product as a condition of 
32 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-86; Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 196-99; Microsoft, 
253 F.3d at 63. 
33 See Meese, Monopolization, supra note 14, at 761. 
34 See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (evaluating requirement that 
purchasers of adding machines also purchase IBM punch cards). 
35 See, e.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Dominos Pizza, Inc. 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 
1997) (evaluating requirement that franchisees purchase pizza dough and sauce from 
the franchisor); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz ofN. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 
1987) (evaluating requirement that franchisees purchase repair parts from 
franchisor). 
36 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486-87 (explaining per se rule in context of 
tying); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958) (holding defendant's 
tying agreements per se unreasonable); IBM, 298 U.S. at 139-40 (holding defen-
dant's tying of punch cards to tabulating machines unreasonable, although not men-
tioning per se rule). But see Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 89-94 (holding that per se rule does 
not apply to tie of platform software to operating system). 
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purchasing the tying product.37 While lower courts have recognized 
justifications for ties deemed "unlawful per se," the Supreme Court 
has refused to endorse the availability of such defenses. 38 
The per se rule against tying contracts does not reflect a determi-
nation that all or most agreements satisfying this test result in lower 
output or higher prices. 39 Instead, the per se rule rests upon the 
assumption that such agreements are the result of "anticompetitive 
forcing."4° Courts have for decades defined such "forcing" as the use 
of market power to compel a purchaser to do something it would not 
do in a competitive market, such as purchase an unwanted product.41 
Such "forcing," it is said, prevents rivals from offering purchasers simi-
lar products and therefore interferes with "competition on the merits" 
analogous to perfect competition.42 If the seller's version of the tied 
37 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1985); Northern 
Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5-7. 
38 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-65 (articulating per se rule without men-
tioning possibility of justification); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25 n.42 (approving 
repeated earlier conclusions that less restrictive means would achieve beneficial pur-
poses of tying contracts); Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6 n.5 (concluding that benign 
functions of such contracts can be achieved by "other means much less inimical to 
competition"); cf. Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1350-51 (entertaining and sustaining an affirm-
ative defense) . 
39 jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 32-42 (O'Connor,]., concurring) (criticizing per se 
rule on this basis). 
40 Id. at 13-16 (majority opinion) (holding that per se rule rests upon conclusion 
that satisfaction of per se test establishes existence of "forcing"); see also Northern 
Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6-7 (same). 
41 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464 (defining market power for purposes of the 
per se rule as "the power 'to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do 
in a competitive market'" (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14)); Jefferson Parish, 
466 U.S. at 12 ("[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in 
the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into 
the purchase of a tied product ... ."); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 
U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (holding market power inquiry examines whether seller has 
power "to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted 
in a completely competitive market"); Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5-6 (asserting tying 
contracts "force[] [buyers] to forgo their free choice between competing products"); 
see also Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera 
of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1997) [hereinafter Meese, Tying] (summariz-
ing development of law on "forcing"). 
42 See jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12 ("When such 'forcing' is present, competition 
on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is 
violated."); Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6 (holding tying contracts imposed by firms 
with market power restrain "competition on the merits"); Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. 
v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (noting that by imposing a tying contract, 
"a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the 'tied' 
product's merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open market"). 
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product really was superior, courts claim, "freely choosing" buyers 
would choose it anyway in a market undistorted by market power.43 
Such forcing itself suffices to establish antitrust harm under § 1. 
Courts and agencies have applied similar logic when condemning 
practices analogous to ties. For instance, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion condemned, via consent decree, a monopolist's favorable pricing 
treatment of retailers that- agreed to devote ninety percent of their 
shelf space to the defendant's products, thereby disadvantaging 
smaller, competing manufacturers as well as those retailers who 
declined such discounts. 44 Relying upon the work of one of the 
nation's leading antitrust scholars, the Commission claimed that such 
differential pricing reflected the exercise of market power to induce 
acceptance of the shelf space provisions and violated the Robinson-
Patman Act. 45 
Indeed, more than three decades earlier the Commission had 
invoked similar logic, convincing the Supreme Court to condemn an 
oil refiner that strongly encouraged its dealers to stock a supplier's 
tires, batteries and accessories.46 Although recognizing that the agree-
ment was not a tying contract, the Court nonetheless agreed with the 
Commission that it was an "unfair method of competition."47 The 
Court emphasized that the defendant and its dealers "do not bargain 
as equals," but that the defendant exerted "power" over dealers. 48 
Indeed, the Court said, defendant's treatment of its dealers mimicked 
the "central competitive characteristic" of a tying arrangement, 
namely, "the utilization of economic power in one market to curtail 
competition in another."49 The Court even approved the Commis-
sion's refusal to consider evidence of the arrangement's benefits, 
because any benefits flowed from "the use of oil company power, to 
effectively sew up large markets."50 
43 See Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605 (" [A]ny intrinsic superiority of the 'tied' 
product would convince freely choosing buyers to select it over others, anyway."); 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) ("If the manufac-
turer's brand of the tied product is in fact superior to that of competitors, the buyer 
will presumably choose it anyway."). 
44 See McCormick & Co., No. 961-0050, 2000 WL 264190, at *3 (F.T.C. Mar. 8, 
2000). 
45 See id. at *12 & n.3 (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power and Secondary-
Line Differential Pricing, 71 GEO. LJ. 1157,1170 (1983)). 
46 SeeAtl. Ref. Co. v. FTC 381 U.S. 367 (1965). 
47 /d. at 369-71. 
48 !d. at 368. 
49 /d. at 369. 
50 !d. at 371. 
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Some have recommended a more fact-intensive "Rule of Reason" 
approach to tying agreements, under which power over the tying 
product would be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for liabil-
ity.51 These advocates echo the more general argument-associated 
with the "Chicago School" of antitrust-that proof of market power 
should be a necessary condition for liability under the Rule of Reason, 
because firms without such power cannot cause anticompetitive 
harm.52 Still, the per se rule against tying and its rationale have 
remained unchanged for over fifty years. 53 
At the same time, § 1 does not prevent the exercise of such power 
to "force" consumers to pay a monopoly price for the tying product. 54 
Instead, as in the § 2 context, courts distinguish between the (legal) 
"use" of power to charge whatever the market will bear and the use of 
51 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37-38 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying th"is fact-intensive approach); Digital Equip. 
Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the same fact-
intensive approach). But see Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding proof of market power not necessary to 
establish liability in Rule of Reason tying case). 
52 See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 217-21 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (invoking similar logic to justify requirement that plaintiff establish 
market power to establish prima facie case under the Rule of Reason); Polk Bros. v. 
Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1986); RicHARD A. PosNER, ANTITRUST 
LAw: AN EcoNOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 165-66 (1976) (arguing that horizontal ancillary 
restraints should be lawful absent proof that the defendants possess market power); 
Frank H. Easterbook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1984) [herein-
after Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust] (proposing that plaintiffs failure to establish 
market power should doom a Rule of Reason case). 
53 At one time, courts equated "economic power" with any departure from per-
fect competition that conferred the slightest power. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 
371 U.S. 38, 45-48 (1962) (holding that copyright possession creates presumption of 
economic power); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(holding that trademark ownership confers economic power sufficient to invoke per 
se rule). Some courts even suggested that the existence of such contracts implied the 
"power" to impose them. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 
504 (1969); Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. at 49 (holding that the existence of market foreclo-
sure confirmed the presumption that copyright conferred economic power); N. Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958) ("The very existence of this host of 
tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great 
power .... "). However, courts have more recently equated such power with the sort 
of "market power" necessary to establish other antitrust violations. See jefferson Parish, 
466 U.S. at 26-29 (holding that thirty percent share of a relevant product market did 
not suffice to establish the sort of economic power necessary to establish a per se tying 
violation). 
54 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) 
(holding that Sherman Act § 1 does not apply to single firm conduct). 
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that same power to impose contractual provisions. 55 The former, one 
might say, constitutes a just reward for merits-based competition, 
while the latter entails the use of power to thwart competition and 
gain more power. 56 Indeed, when initially justifying the per se rule 
against ties, the Supreme Court expressly invoked § 2 doctrine's ban 
on the "use" of power to disadvantage rivals.57 
As noted above, some lower courts have allowed defendants to 
justify tying contracts that are otherwise unlawful per se. Nonetheless, 
these courts still rely upon a market power model of contract forma-
tion. Thus, even if a defendant proves that the agreement creates 
benefits, plaintiffs nonetheless prevail if they show that the defendant 
can realize the same benefits by means of a less restrictive alterna-
tive.58 As in the monopolization context, this "less restrictive alterna-
tive test" depends upon an assumption that the restraint's benefits 
coexist with harms, namely, "coercive forcing."59 Thus, even courts 
that have recognized the propensity of such contracts to produce ben-
efits nonetheless assume that sellers employ market power to impose 
them and treat such coercive imposition as a harm coexisting with any 
benefits. 
55 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14 (" [T] he law draws a distinction between the 
exploitation of market power by merely enhancing the price of the tying product, on 
the one hand, and by attempting to impose restraints on competition in the market 
for the tied product, on the other. When the seller's power is just used to maximize 
its return in the tying product market, where presumably its product enjoys some 
justifiable advantage over its competitors, the competitive ideal of the Sherman Act is 
not necessarily compromised. But if that power is used to impair competition on the 
merits in another market, a potentially inferior product may be insulated from com-
petitive pressures."). 
56 See id. 
57 See Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953) 
(invoking Griffith holding that a monopolist may not "use" power to enter contracts 
that disadvantage rivals as support for the per se rule against tying contracts); see also 
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1979) (analo-
gizing § 2's abuse of power test to the per se rule against tying). 
58 See Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 
1039-42 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding a tie unlawful where "less restrictive alternative" was 
purportedly available); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 50 (same); see also Eastman Kodak 
v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 484-86 (1992) (rejecting proffered justi-
fication for tie under § 2 where plaintiff offered proof that less restrictive alternatives 
could produce same benefits). 
59 Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise 
Tying Contracts, 95 MicH. L. REv. 111, 141-42 (1996) [hereinafter Meese, Antitrust 
Balancing]. 
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C. In Pari Delicto 
The "market power" account of contract formation also figures 
prominently in the law governing who may challenge unlawful agree-
ments, even agreements with no exclusionary impact. Assume that a 
franchisee launches a § 1 challenge to a franchise contract containing 
exclusionary agreements such as tying and exclusive dealing provi-
sions as well as non-exclusionary contracts such as minimum resale 
price maintenance and exclusive territories. This challenge seems 
odd at first because the franchisee is challenging provisions to which it 
agreed. Indeed, at common law, the doctrine of in pari delicto ("in 
equal fault") would have barred such challenges, preventing plaintiffs 
from profiting from their unlawful acts.60 Still, antitrust courts often 
allow such challenges to proceed, even if the plaintiff entered the 
agreement with full knowledge of its exclusionary potential. Indeed, 
over four decades ago, the Supreme Court held that in pari delicto did 
not bar a suit by dealers challenging tying and exclusive dealing agree-
ments as well as agreements setting minimum resale prices and grant-
ing exclusive territories. 61 This was so, the Court said, despite the 
lower court's finding that plaintiffs were fully aware of the agree-
ments' provisions, reaped "enormous profits" from the franchise 
opportunities, and sought out additional franchise agreements subject 
to the same provisions.62 Such restrictions could only benefit the 
manufacturer, the Court said, with the result that dealers' "participa-
tion was not voluntary in any meaningful sense"63 because they were 
"forced to accept [the] more onerous terms as a condition of doing 
business."64 
Although the dealers may have actively sought the franchise 
opportunities, they did not, the Court said, seek "each and every 
clause of the agreement."65 Instead, petitioners "apparently" accepted 
these restrictive provisions to obtain the more attractive franchise 
60 See Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1966) 
(collecting authorities); see also Eastman Kodak Co. of N.Y. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 
273 U.S. 359, 377 (1927) (opining that the defense would apply if plaintiff had 
entered contract voluntarily); Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 810, 819 
(3d Cir. 1921) (holding plaintiff may not recover prospective profits from illegal 
scheme). 
61 See Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 137 (1968). 
62 Id. at 138. 
63 ld. at 139. 
64 Id. at 140. 
65 Id. at 139. 
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opportunity. 66 While the restrictive provisions may have conferred 
some minor benefits on the dealers, they did not, according to the 
Court, "mitigate ... the losses that a dealer would suffer when forced 
to buy higher-priced [defendant's] products .... "67 Instead the 
restrictions were involuntary, the result of the manufacturer's exercise 
of market power.68 Even though the opinion announcing the judg-
ment suggested a blanket abolition of the defense, controlling concur-
ring opinions opined that the defense should be available when 
parties to the restraint had bargained on equal terms.69 One concur-
ring Justice even suggested that the defense would be available if 
plaintiff-dealers had agreed to exclusionary agreements benefitting 
the manufacturer in return for anticompetitive contracts benefitting 
dealers.70 Though announced at the height of antitrust's inhospitality 
era, this holding still stands, regardless whether the challenged agree-
ment is "exclusionary."71 
66 I d. The Court offered no citation of the record for this assertion. This conclu-
sion, then, seems to have been based purely on a theoretical appraisal of the pur-
ported nature and impact of such agreements. 
67 Id. at 141 n.5. The Court also remarked that "[n]either of these provisions 
[requirements of exclusive dealing and carrying a full line of parts] could be in the 
dealer's self-interest since they obligate him to buy from Midas regardless of whether 
more favorable prices can be obtained from other sources of supply and regardless of 
whether he needs certain parts at all." Id. at 140-41. 
68 Id. at 141-42; id. at 145 (White,]., concurring); accord Simpson v. Union Oil 
Co., 377 U.S 13 (1964); Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'! Truck Leasing Ass'n, 830 F.2d 
716, 720 (7th Cir. 1987) (reading Perma Life as resting on finding that restraints 
before it resulted from economic coercion). 
69 See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138-41 (majority opinion); id. at 145 (White, J., 
concurring) ("When those with market power and leverage persuade, coerce, or influ-
ence others to cooperate in an illegal combination to their damage, allowing recovery 
to the latter [dealer] is wholly consistent with the purpose of§ 4, since it will deter 
those most likely to be responsible for organizing forbidden schemes."); id. at 149-51 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that the doctrine should not bar dealer challenge 
of exclusive dealing and tying contracts that can only benefit the manufacturer). 
70 !d. at 149-50 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
71 See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985) (hold-
ing that defense still stands); Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 
424 F.3d 363, 381-84 (3d Cir. 2005) (reading Perma Life as barring suit by antitrust 
plaintiffs who are involved at the "requisite level" in the challenged conspiracy); id. at 
381-82 (invoking doctrine in support of conclusion that indirect purchasers could 
not treat dealers as "co-conspirators" with manufacturer that had imposed exclusive 
dealing contracts); id. at 383 (relying in part upon district court's conclusion that 
dealer participation in exclusive dealing contract was not "voluntary in any meaning-
ful sense"); Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding doctrine 
barred suit when both sides were in fact equally responsible for the restraint); Gen. 
Leaseways, 830 F.2d at 720-31 (sustaining jury's finding of zero damages based on 
findings that the plaintiff had participated equally in the creation and enforcement of 
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In short, several antitrust doctrines rest upon the assumption that 
firms with market power employ that power to "impose" exclusionary 
contracts on dealers or consumers. Absent such power, it is said, firms 
could not obtain agreement to such contracts, which necessarily make 
dealers or consumers "worse off" than they otherwise would be. More-
over courts presume, sometimes conclusively, that the use of market 
power to impose such agreements constitutes antitrust harm justifying 
Sherman Act condemnation. While courts allow firms to obtain or 
maintain monopoly power and thereby charge high prices, by engag-
ing in "competition on the merits," they condemn the use of that 
power to impose agreements that supposedly extend or protect such 
power. 72 Finally, the "market power" model of contract formation 
informs doctrines governing which parties may challenge otherwise 
unlawful agreements. 
II. PRicE THEORY, WoRKABLE CoMPETITION, AND THE "MARKET 
POWER" MODEL OF CONTRACT FORMATION 
The Sherman Act does not mention any taxonomy between coer-
cive agreements and "competition on the merits." Instead, the distinc-
tion is a judicial gloss on the phrases "restraint of trade" and 
"monopolize''-in §§ 1 and 2 of the Act, respectively, glosses that only 
began to appear more than three decades after the Act's passage.73 
This Part finds the source of this gloss in economic theory, namely, 
neoclassical price theory: the economic model that informed indus-
trial organization when courts first generated these doctrines. 
A. The Rule of Reason, Price Theory, and Workable Competition 
The Sherman Act's "Rule of Reason" impels courts to determine 
whether a contract produces "monopoly or its consequences," defined 
as the use of power to increase prices, reduce output, or reduce qual-
ity. 74 From the beginning, courts turned to economic theory to deter-
the challenged scheme); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 387 
(4th Cir. 1982) (reading Penna Life to allow assertion of in pari delicto defense when 
both parties participate in the formation and execution of the challenged agree-
ment);Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976) (same); Columbia 
Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 15-16 (4th Cir. 1971) (same). 
72 See Page, Legal Realism, supra note 28, at 27-28. 
73 See United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1927) (noting 
that antitrust law does not ban unexercised power but instead only regulates "unlaw-
ful conduct in the exercise of [that] power"). 
74 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1911); id. at 52 (list-
ing increased prices, reduced output and reduced quality as three evils of monopoly); 
Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911); see also Alan J. Meese, Price 
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mine the causes and consequences of challenged conduct. 75 In 
particular, courts have relied upon industrial organization, that subset 
of economic theory that seeks to identifY the welfare consequences of 
various business activities.76 Indeed, five decades ago, one leading 
industrial organization theorist summarized the discipline as directed 
toward determining the impact of market structure and market con-
duct on market performance.77 "[M]arket conduct," he said, 
"embrac[ed] the practices, policies, and devices which [enterprises] 
employ in arriving at adjustments to the markets in which they 
participate .... "78 
For most of the twentieth century, however, industrial organiza-
tion was not so much an independent discipline as it was applied price 
theory. 79 Writing in the early 1970s, Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase 
reviewed two leading textbooks on industrial organization produced 
by Joe Bain and George Stigler, scholars representing the Harvard 
and Chicago schools-supposedly at odds with one another-respec-
Theory, Competition and the Rule of Reason, 2003 ILL. L. REv. 77, 84-88 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Meese, Rule of Reason] (detailing content of Standard Oil's Rule of Reason). 
75 See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 74 YALE LJ. 775, 805 (1965) [hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason] 
(explaining how the logic of the Rule of Reason requires courts to employ up to date 
economic theory to determine the consequences of challenged restraints); Meese, 
Rule of Reason, supra note 74, at 89-92 (same); see also HERBERT HoVENKAMP, ENTER-
PRISE AND AMERICAN LAw 268 (1991) [hereinafter HoVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE] ("One of 
the great myths about American antitrust policy is that courts began to adopt an 'eco-
nomic approach' to antitrust problems only in the 1970's. At most, this 'revolution' 
in antitrust policy represented a change in economic models. Antitrust policy has 
been forged by economic ideology since its inception."); MichaelS. Jacobs, An Essay 
on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 219, 226 (1995) ("In 
almost every era of antitrust history, policymakers have employed economic models to 
explain or modifY the state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement."). 
76 See joE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2 (1959) [hereinafter BAIN, INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION] (defining subject to be studied as "the perlormance of business 
enterprises-their performance, that is, in aspects or dimensions which appear to 
affect importantly the general public welfare"). 
77 See id. at 3. 
78 /d. (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 266-68 (defining "market conduct" to 
include collusive agreements and exclusionary tactics); id. at 330-31 (defining exclu-
sionary conduct to include tying agreements, requirements contracts and similar 
conduct). 
79 SeeR. H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in PoLICY IssuEs 
AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 61-64 (Victor R. 
Fuchs ed., 1972) [hereinafter Coase, Industrial Organization] (arguing that, as ofl972, 
Industrial Organization consisted simply of applied price theory); Oliver E. William-
son, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. LJ. 271, 295 (1987) [hereinafter Williamson, Delimit-
ing Antitrust] (discussing "applied price theory tradition" of antitrust). · 
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tively.8° Coase concluded that "[e]ssentially, both [authors] consider 
the subject of industrial organization as applied price-theory," what 
Coase would also call "blackboard economics,"81 an assessment that 
Stigler and others shared.82 
Price theory, in turn, was the subset of microeconomics that 
sought to predict the allocational results of a price system based upon 
private property and free exchange.83 The foundation for analysis was 
"perfect competition," a state of affairs that rested upon numerous 
assumptions, most quite unrealistic.84 The model assumed a baseline 
of well-defined property rights and the absence of fraud or other 
impediments to bargaining.85 Exogenous technological considera-
tions determined possible methods of production and thus each 
80 See Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 79, at 61-64. Bain received his 
PhD from Harvard, where he participated in the working group on workable competi-
tion founded by Edward Mason. Bain's industrial organization text identified his "pri-
mary obligation" to Mason. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 76; 
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 
925-26 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Chicago School] (distinguishing Chicago from the 
Harvard School); id. at 928 n.8 (stating that the Harvard School's position was "well 
conveyed in the writings of Edward S. Mason"). 
81 Coase, Industrial Organization, supra note 79, at 62; see id. at 61-64 (arguing 
that, as of 1972, industrial organization consisted simply of applied price theory). 
82 See joE BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 25-27 (1968); RicHARD CAVEs, AMERI-
CAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCf, PERFORMANCE 15 (3d ed. 1972) ("'[l]ndustrial 
organization' applies the economist's models of price theory to the industries in the 
world around us."); GEORGE j. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 1 (1968) 
(stating "there is no such subject as industrial organization" because courses taught 
on the subject simply replicated "the content of economic theory-price or resource 
allocation theory"). 
83 See joE S. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 1-15 (1952) [hereinafter BAIN, PRICE THEORY]. 
84 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RisK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 76-81 (1921) [hereinaf-
ter KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT] (detailing various assumptions of perfect 
competition model); see also George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition: Historically Contem-
plated, 65 J. PoL. EcoN. 1, ll (1957) [hereinafter Stigler, Perfect Competition] (asserting 
that Knight provided first complete articulation of perfect competition model). 
85 See YoRAM BARZEL, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERlY RIGHTS ll-13 (1997) 
(arguing perfect competition depends upon well-enforced property rights); CARL 
KAvsEN & DoNALD F. TuRNER, ANTITRUST PoLICY 13 n.12 (1959) (arguing efficient 
market competition requires well-defined property rights); KNIGHT, RisK, UNCER-
TAINTY, AND PROFIT, supra note 84, at 56 ("The foundation of the process [studied] is 
the private ownership of productive resources-a synonym for individual freedom."); 
id. at 78-79 (arguing perfect competition's no fraud assumption is a redundant impli-
cation of perfect knowledge); GEORGE]. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF CoMPETITIVE PRICE 
22 (1942) [hereinafter STIGLER, CoMPETITIVE PRICE] (arguing perfect competition 
requires enforcement of contracts and protection of private property); Friedrich A. 
Hayek, "Free" Enterprise and Competitive Order, in INDIVIDUALISM AND EcoNOMIC ORDER 
107, ll0-16 (1948) (contending that well-functioning competitive order depends 
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firm's "production function," namely, a mathematical representation 
of the relationship between the costs of various inputs and the firm's 
output.86 Firms took this function as a given and selected the most 
efficient, i.e., cost-minimizing, method of production in light of the 
costs of relevant inputs.87 Such purely technological considerations 
also explained the boundaries of the firm, namely, what a firm 
chooses to make itself and what it purchases from others.88 In this 
imaginary world, the market boasted innumerable firms, each too 
small to influence market price.89 Firms acted independently, infor-
mation costs were nonexistent, and there were no obstacles to the 
movement of resources such as labor and capital.90 These latter 
assumptions ensured that economic activity and exchange occurred 
instantaneously and produced an equilibrium of price and output, 
excluding the operation of time from the model.91 
upon properly-designed "legal framework" of contract, property, tort and business 
law). 
86 See KELVIN LANCASTER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MICROECONOMICS 73 (1969) 
("A general statement of all outputs that can be obtained from all efficient input 
combinations is called the production function."); TIBOR SciTOVSKY, WELFARE AND CoM-
PETITION 113-21 (1951) (explaining concept of production function); STIGLER, COM· 
PETITIVE PRICE, supra note 85, at 109-10 ("Production functions are descriptive of 
techniques or systems of organization of productive services, and they are therefore 
taken from disciplines such as engineering and industrial chemistry: to the economic 
theorist they are data of analysis."); Frank H. Knight, Immutable Law in Economics: Its 
Reality and Limitations, 36 AM. EcoN. REv. 93, 96 (1946) [hereinafter Knight, Immutable 
Law] ("Economic theory ... leav[es] technology to its various special disciplines, from 
shop practice and agronomy to cookery and artistic technique. This separation ... 
assum[es] that technology is 'given,' that in using any means available to achieve a 
physically defined end that process will be chosen, among those known in the arts and 
science of the culture in question, which yields the largest ratio of output to input."). 
87 See ScrTOVSKY, supra note 86, at 113-21. 
88 See infra note 105 and accompanying text. 
89 See KNIGHT, RisK, UNCERTAINlY, AND PROFIT, supra note 84, at 55, 174. 
90 See id., at 77 (explaining that perfect competition depends upon assumption 
that individuals "'own themselves[,] [that] there is no exercise of constraint over any 
individual by another"); id. (arguing that perfect competition requires "'perfect 
mobility' in all economic adjustments, no cost involved in movements or changes"); 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRicE THEORY 10 (1962) (arguing the price system "assume[s] ... 
[t]here is freedom to compete but not freedom to combine"); Stigler, Perfect Competi-
tion, supra note 84, at 14 ("[I] t seems essential to assume the absence of collusion as a 
supplement to the presence of large numbers .... "). 
91 See KNIGHT, RisK, UNCERTAINlY, AND PROFIT, supra note 84, at 81 (noting that 
the perfect competition model assumes that production occurs in "a brief interval of 
time," after which all market participants "meet[] in a central market to exchange 
their wares"); FRANK M. MAcHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF EcoNOMics 178-79 (1995) (describing perfect competition's instantaneous pro-
cess of market clearing); Hayek, The Meaning of Competition, supra note 85, at 92, 96 
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In this world each firm was a "price taker," observing price in the 
relevant product market and setting output that maximized its profit 
in light of production cost, determined by the firm's production func-
tion.92 Given these conditions, no firm exercised market power, i.e., 
priced above cost.93 A firm that priced above this market price would 
instantly lose all sales.94 In this hypothetical world, individual self-
interested transactions would ensure an allocation of resources maxi-
mizing output from society's given endowment of resources.95 
Price theorists did not believe that the perfect competition model 
accurately described the real world. For instance, many markets vio-
lated the assumption of innumerable firms, and products were rarely 
homogenous. Both departures could confer market power-the abil-
ity to price above costs. This exercise of power, in turn, would distort 
the allocation of resources as firms reduced their output, diverting 
resources to less valuable uses. 
Still, these scholars believed that certain departures from perfect 
competition could be beneficial. For instance, technology might 
require firms to achieve significant scale to minimize production 
cost.96 Achievement of such scale could reduce the number of inde-
pendent firms in the market, contravening perfect competition's 
numerosity assumption.97 Still, this departure was generally justified, 
because the benefits of cost reductions outweighed the welfare loss 
from increased concentration and resulting misallocation.98 In the 
(noting that perfect competition instantaneously produces optimal resource alloca-
tion); see also LEON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PuRE EcoNOMICS 242 (William Jaffe trans., 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1954) (1926) ("Once the equilibrium has been established in 
principle, exchange can take place immediately. Production, however, requires a cer-
tain lapse of time. We shall resolve the second difficulty purely and simply by ignor-
ing the time element at this point."). 
92 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining role of production func-
tion in determining firm's costs in perfect competition). 
93 See STIGLER, CoMPETITIVE PRICE, supra note 85, at 21-22, 149. 
94 See id. at 156 (arguing that in perfect competition "no firm can sell any amount 
above the ruling price"). 
95 See KNIGHT, RisK, UNCERTAINlY, AND PROFIT, supra note 84, at 85-86. 
96 See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 146-52; id. at 146 
("[T]here are available to firms in almost any industry certain economies of large 
scale production, such that, by becoming larger up to a certain point, ... the firm 
attains lower costs per unit of output produced."); ScrrovsKY, supra note 86, at 331-33 
(detailing concept of economies of scale). 
97 See George ]. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 AM. EcoN. REv. 1 
(1942) [hereinafter Stigler, Extent and Bases]. 
98 See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 85, at 5-8; joHN PERRY MILLER, UNFAIR CoM-
PETITION 411 (1941) (arguing that "it would not be feasible to pulverize industry suffi-
ciently to approximate pure competition" because doing so would "interfere[] with 
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same way, product differentiation would confer modest market power 
on firms, power generally justified by the benefits of product variety. 99 
The prospect of beneficial departures from perfect competition 
had obvious implications for public policy. Despite the theoretical 
utility of the model, scholars generally rejected perfect competition as 
a desideratum of public policy, including antitrust policy. Instead, 
these scholars argued that policy should pursue "workable competi-
tion," tolerating departures from perfect competition and resulting 
market power whenever necessary to achieve offsetting efficiencies.100 
B. Workable Competition and Non-Standard Contracts 
While the "workable competition" model tolerated certain depar-
tures from perfect competition, the model still embraced numerous 
other assumptions as normatively desirable goals. 101 Non-standard 
the attainment of the optimum scale of plant and rate of operation"); GEORGE W. 
SToCKING & MYRoN W. WATKINS, MoNOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 53-61, 108 (1951); 
id. at 13 ("Pure competition can scarcely be realized in a machine age."); see also 
Meese, Monopolization, supra note 14 (collecting additional sources). Professor Wil-
liamson formalized this insight, showing that a merger to monopoly producing a 
slight reduction in production costs would usually result in a net improvement in 
economic welfare. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Wel-
fare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 18 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson, Welfare Tradeoffs]. 
99 EdwardS. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE LJ. 34, 36-37 (1937) 
(concluding that economists should not automatically oppose product differentiation 
despite resulting market power); EdwardS. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly 
Problem in the United States, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1266-67 (1949) [hereinafter Mason, 
Current Status] (stating that perfect competition is only desirable when it maximizes 
economic welfare); Meese, Monopolization, supra note 14, at 780 n.156 (collecting 
additional authorities to this effect). 
100 SeeKAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 85, at 44-45 ("[T]he primary goal of antitrust 
policy [should] be the limitation of undue market power to the extent consistent with 
maintaining desirable levels of economic performance."); id. at 78 ("Market power 
resting on certain bases we consider 'reasonable,' because we think it either undesir-
able or impossible to eliminate them."); id. (noting market power resulting from 
economies of scale is "reasonable" because "[i]t could be reduced only at the cost of 
producing at higher costs in inefficiently small units; this price we do not desire to 
pay"); EDWARDS. MAsoN, Workable Competition Versus Workable Monopoly, in EcoNOMIC 
CONCENTRATION AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 382, 387 (1957) (recognizing that soci-
ety must tolerate some market power so that firms may realize scale economies); see 
also].M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. EcoN. REv. 241 (1940) 
(outlining a concept of workable competition). 
101 See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 85, at 7 ("[T]he rigorous model of the per-
fectly competitive market is the appropriate starting point of any definition [of com-
petition relevant to antitrust policy] .... " (footnote omitted)); id. at 8 (" [T] hough 
the model of [perfectly] competitive market structure is not usable as such in our 
definition of competition, other concepts of the model are."); Friedrich A. Hayek, 
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contracts contravened· several of these remaining assumptions. For 
one thing, many such agreements limited market rivalry, offending 
the model's requirement that market participants make independent 
decisions. 102 Perhaps most importantly, many non-standard agree-
ments constrained one party's future autonomy. For instance, a 
dealer that signed an exclusive dealing arrangement would forfeit its 
preexisting right-assumed by perfect competition-to use its labor 
and property as it wished, that is, to purchase and resell the goods of 
other manufacturers.103 This constraint, as noted above, seems to 
render the relevant market less rather than more competitive. Moreo-
ver, dealers realized no apparent benefit from this constraint on their 
freedom of action. 104 
The mere fact that such contracts resulted in departures from 
perfect competition did not require their condemnation. Still, unlike 
economies of scale and product differentiation, non-standard con-
tracts produced no apparent benefits. According to price theory, 
technological efficiencies gave rise to firms and determined their 
boundaries, and increased efficiency manifested itself in altered pro-
supra note 85, at 92, 94 (noting that most assumptions of perfect competition "are 
equally assumed in the discussion of the various 'imperfect' or 'monopolistic' mar-
kets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic 'perfections'"); Richard N. Lan-
glois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time, in CoASEAN 
EcoNOMics: LAw AND EcoNOMICS AND THE NEw INSTITUTIONAL EcoNOMICS 1, 2 
(Steven G. Medema ed., 1998) (noting that joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlin, 
pioneers of oligopoly theory, relied upon other assumptions of the perfect competi-
tion model). 
102 See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (evaluating and condemn-
ing intrabrand price restraints ancillary to valid joint venture). 
103 See KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT, supra note 84, at 77 (explaining 
that perfect competition depends upon assumption that individuals "own themselves" 
and that there is "no exercise of constraint over any individual by another individual 
or by 'society'"); Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How the 
Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. CoMP. L. & EcoN. 21, 75 (2005) 
[hereinafter Meese, Market Failure] (explaining how exclusive dealing contracts 
offend assumption of free mobility of factors of production); see also supra note 85 and 
accompanying text (explaining how perfect competition assumed well-defined and 
unrestrained property rights). 
104 Indeed, some scholars argued that if dealers did benefit from exclusivity, they 
would choose such exclusivity voluntarily, so there was no need for manufacturers to 
impose contractual exclusivity. See joEL DIRlAM & ALFRED KAHN, FAJR CoMPETITION: 
THE LAw AND EcoNOMICS OF ANTITRUST PoLICY 181-87 (1954) (contending that deal-
ers will deal exclusively with manufacturers without contractual restraint if exclusivity 
creates benefits); Derek C. Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive 
Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sur. CT. REv. 267, 307-08 (1961) (same). 
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duction functions and lower production costs. 105 Firms realized such 
efficiencies "internally," in the course of manufacturing a product, 
before sale to others.106 While the realization of efficiencies could 
lower prices, exclude less efficient rivals and perhaps confer market 
power, such realization was an ordinary commercial tactic that did not 
itself entail exercise such power. 
Once the firm produced and sold its product "on the market," 
there were no technological benefits from restraining purchasers' dis-
cretion via tying or exclusive dealing provisions, for instance. 107 Such 
agreements did not alter a firm's production function and could not 
produce technological efficiencies analogous to, say, economies of 
scale. 108 Nor did they alter ("differentiate") the product sold by the 
105 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 7-8, 
86-87, 371 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] (describing 
price theory's technological account of the firm and scope of vertical integration). 
Textbooks of the era stressed that efficiencies were technological in origin, and that 
technological considerations explained the existence and boundaries of firms. See, 
e.g., WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, MARKET PoWER AND EcoNOMIC WELFARE 37 (1970) ("The 
cost advantages in a firm may be of two types: technical and pecuniary. Only techni-
cal economies represent a genuine improvement in social efficiency." (emphasis omit-
ted)). The chief example, which economists repeatedly invoked, entailed integration 
of iron making with steel production to achieve cost savings. See F.M. ScHERER, INDUS-
TRIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 70 (1970); Meese, Monopolization, 
supra note 14, at 778 n.146 (collecting examples); Stigler, Extent and Bases, supra note 
97, at 22 ("Of course[,] when vertical integration rests on technological economies-
the stock example is the hot strip mill-the question of monopoly is usually 
irrelevant."). 
106 SeeR. H. CoASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAw 3 (1990) [hereinafter 
COASE, THE FIRM] ("The firm to an economist ... is effectively defined as a cost curve 
and a demand curve, and the theory [of the firm] is simply the logic of optimal pric-
ing and input combination." (internal quotation marks omitted)); WILLIAMSON, Eco-
NOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 371 ("[T]rue economies take a technological 
form, [and] hence are fully realized within firms. [Hence, according to the price-
theoretic paradigm, there was] nothing to be gained by introducing nonstandard 
terms into market-mediated exchange .... "); see also ScnovsKY, supra note 86, at 
159-71 (describing "efficiency of the firm" as involving use of available technology to 
combine inputs into outputs at lowest possible cost). 
107 See WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 371-72; see also 
Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. 
L. REv. 50, 63-64 (1958) [hereinafter Turner, Tying Arrangements] (arguing that ties 
do not contribute to cost savings). 
108 Professor Donald Turner, a member of the Harvard School of antitrust analy-
sis, responded to the possibility that tying contracts might result in cost savings as 
follows: 
But it is difficult to see how the [interest in reducing costs] could be [served 
by a tie]. If the products are completely different, the likelihood of joint 
production costs seems very small. As well, the time differential between the 
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firm enforcing the agreement. Moreover, the proponents of such 
agreements expended resources negotiating, enforcing and even 
defending them in court, and presumably expected some benefit 
from them. Absent any efficiency benefits, it seemed logical to 
assume that the proponent expected to derive benefits by obtaining 
or protecting market power. 109 Given these assumptions, it is no sur-
prise that scholars uniformly interpreted such contracts as departures 
from perfect competition that, like other departures, produced mar-
ket power and distorted the allocation of resources, but without offset-
ting benefits. 110 This, of course, is the modern rationale for treating 
certain contracts as "unlawful per se."111 
The mere fact that agreements are harmful because they create 
or protect market power does not mean a firm used monopoly power 
to impose them. Cartel agreements, for instance, are purely voluntary 
contracts that can do great harm.l 12 Moreover, if agreements pro-
duce harm, the method of contract formation would seem irrelevant. 
Nonetheless, during this era, scholars repeatedly asserted that firms 
used preexisting "market power" or monopoly power to impose such 
agreements on unwilling dealers and consumers, as a means of 
extending or protecting that power. A classic example of this reason-
ing is found in an article by Donald Turner, a Harvard Law School 
economist, on tying contracts.113 Turner argued that purchasers pre-
ferred not to enter such agreements, since the resulting obligation 
might prevent buyers from purchasing more attractive substitutes for 
the tied product in the future. 114 Thus, Turner said, such contracts 
sale of the tying product and the sale of the tied seems to limit severely the 
possibilities of joint-cost savings. 
Turner, Tying Arrangements, supra note 107, at 63-64. This argument plainly rests 
upon the assumption that the only source of efficiencies is technological. 
109 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 366 (according to 
price theory "efforts to reconfigure firm and market structures that violated ... 'natu-
ral' boundaries were believed to have market power origins."); Meese, Rule of Reason, 
supra note 74, at 98 (explaining how inhospitality era scholars drew this inference). 
110 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining price theory's assump-
tion that departures from perfect competition such as product differentiation and 
economies of scale produced market power). 
111 See Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note 75, at 385-87. 
112 John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1906 (1988) [hereinafter Wiley, Prisoner's Dilemma]. 
113 See Turner, Tying Arrangements, supra note 107, at 60. 
114 See id. at 60-62. Turner seemed to concede that a small number of ties might 
be "efficient" because they helped the manufacturer protect the tying product's good-
will. See id. at 64. Nonetheless, he concluded that such instances were sufficiently 
rare that courts could conclusively presume that tying contracts reflected an "illegal 
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were imposed via market power, no matter how slight, in an effort to 
protect such power or obtain more. 115 
This conclusion, which many scholars shared, is not surprising in 
light of the intellectual milieu of the time.116 As noted above, such 
agreements limited moment-to-moment rivalry and reduced the dis-
cretion of parties to them, thereby interfering with the "normal" allo-
cation of resources. 117 Moreover, these restraints made parties bound 
to them worse off, at least in the period when they were enforced, by 
preventing them from purchasing from whomever they pleased.118 
Finally, unlike internal expansion or product differentiation, these 
agreements produced no apparent benefits that could explain pur-
chasers' consent. Thus, it seemed logical to conclude that the manu-
facturer who obtained such an agreement had employed some 
influence-call it "power"-to overcome purchasers' will, impose 
such restraints, prevent the free movement of resources, and prevent 
the operation of perfect competition.U9 Indeed, Turner and his co-
author, fellow economist Carl Kaysen, expressly opined that any 
departure from the results implied by perfect competition was a mani-
festation of market power. 120 
purpose" and "some power over the tying product." Id. He did not explain how 
sellers obtained agreement to one of these rare efficient ties. 
115 See id. at 64; see also KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 85, at 157-59 (arguing that 
tying contracts necessarily reflect an exercise of market power). 
116 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 98, at 199 (noting that tying contracts were neces-
sarily the result of market power); id. at 210 (noting that exclusive dealing contracts 
were necessarily the result of market power); ALFRED R. OxENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRIC-
ING AND MARKET PRACTICES 210-14 ( 1951) (describing non-standard contracts, includ-
ing tying, as necessarily resulting from unequal "bargaining power"); MYRON WATKINS, 
PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITION PRACTICES 220-22 (1940) (arguing that tying 
contracts are necessarily the result of market power); Alfred E. Kahn, A Legal and 
Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE LJ. 293, 324 n.160 
(1954) [hereinafter Kahn, Appraisa[J (arguing that tying contracts are necessarily the 
result of market power); George J. Stigler, Mergers and Preventative Antitrust Policy, 104 
U. PA. L. REv.176, 176 (1955) [hereinafter Stigler, PreventativeAntitrustPolicy] ("[I]tis 
evident that [tying and exclusive dealing] can arise only when monopoly power is 
already possessed."). 
117 See supra notes 105, 110 and accompanying text. 
118 Cf Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 384 U.S. 134, 140-41 & n.5 
( 1968) (explaining that dealers could not benefit from an agreement not to purchase 
from a lower-price or higher quality supplier). 
119 See Meese, Market Failure, supra note 103, at 80-82. 
120 See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 85, at 8 ("Where firms can persistently behave 
over substantial periods of time in a manner which differs from the behavior that the 
competitive market would impose on competitive firms facing similar cost and 
demand conditions, they can be identified as possessing market power."); id. at 75 
(reiterating this assertion). 
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Some such contracts arose in unconcentrated markets, thus sug-
gesting a method of formation unrelated to market power. Still, 
Kaysen and Turner, for instance, portrayed ties entered by small firms 
as "random small transactions of no consequence."I 21 The dominant 
economic paradigm simply had no alternative explanation for such 
agreements.122 
Far less prevalent, however, was any precise description of just 
how, exactly, this process of contract formation actually played out. 
Nor is the process of such contract formation immediately apparent. 
Market power, after all, consists of the power profitably to reduce out-
put below the competitive level and thus raise price above cost.123 It is 
not obvious how reducing output and raising price can induce a pur-
chaser to accept an onerous contractual provision. 
C. Workable Competition and Antitrust Doctrine 
From about 1940-1978, courts, scholars, and the enforcement 
agencies bought into price theory's workable competition model 
"hook, line and sinker," and this reliance gave rise to the so-called 
"inhospitality tradition" of antitrust. 124 Workable competition and the 
inhospitality tradition it bred induced courts to condemn all sorts of 
non-standard contracts, including tying agreements, minimum and 
maximum resale price maintenance, exclusive territories, and exclu-
121 !d. at 159. 
122 See id. at 157-59 (discussing tying contracts without offering alternative 
account of how such agreements are formed); cf. THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRucruRE 
OF SciENTIFIC REvoLUTIONs 52-65 (1962) (noting that scientists treat phenomena 
inexplicable under current models as "anomalies"). 
123 See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. 
124 See WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 19 (describing 
inhospitality tradition of antitrust); id. at 370-73 (describing influence of inhospitality 
tradition on antitrust treatment of non-standard contracts); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is 
There A Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705, 715 (1982) [hereinafter Easter-
brook, Ratchet] ("[The] 'inhospitality tradition of antitrust' ... called for courts to 
strike down business practices that were not clearly procompetitive. In this tradition 
an inference of monopolization followed from the courts' inability to grasp how a 
practice might be consistent with substantial competition. The tradition took hold 
when many practices were genuine mysteries to economists, and monopolistic expla-
nations of mysteries were congenial. The same tradition emphasized competition in 
the spot market."). The phrase "inhospitality tradition" apparently was coined by Pro-
fessor Donald Turner, an economist who headed the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice in the 1960s. According to Turner, "I approach territorial and 
customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but inhospitably in 
the tradition of antitrust law." Donald F. Turner, SorTII! Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 
N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N. ANTITRusT L. SYMP. 1, 1-2. 
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sive dealing agreements. 125 Such agreements, courts said, limited 
"competition" between otherwise independent firms without produc-
ing any offsetting benefits not available via less restrictive means. 126 
More recently, courts have backed away from some of the more 
extreme manifestations of the inhospitality tradition, holding that 
many restrictions once deemed unlawful per se should now be ana-
lyzed under the Rule of Reason.l27 At the same time, courts still 
retain certain per se rules, and the methodology for conducting Rule 
of Reason analysis reflects various-and outmoded-price-theoretic 
postulates.128 
Workable competition and its account of non-standard contracts 
plainly informed the various antitrust doctrines that depend upon a 
"market power" account of contract formation. Consider the defini-
tion of monopoly power, the first element of the monopolization 
offense. As noted above, courts define "monopoly power" as the 
power to "control prices or exclude competition."129 Market defini-
tion and calculation of market shares is a necessary condition for a 
125 See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 74, at 124-34 (explaining how neoclassi-
cal price theory informed Supreme Court's § 1 jurisprudence during the so-called 
"inhospitality era" of antitrust). Scholars have offered various accounts of how price 
theory gave rise to economists' hostility toward non-standard contracts. Compare WIL-
LIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105 (emphasizing price theory's techno-
logical conception of the firm that purportedly precluded recognition that non-
standard contracts overcame market failure), with Meese, Market Failure, supra note 
103 (arguing that price theory's paradigm for analyzing market failure questions 
blocked the recognition that non-standard agreements could overcome market 
failure). 
126 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (banning exclu-
sive territories ancillary to legitimate venture because agreements interfered with the 
"freedom of traders" to sell where they wished); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 
152 (1968) (banning maximum resale price maintenance because agreements would 
"cripple the freedom of traders" to set prices); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 
316, 320, 321 (1966) (finding that a primary dealing agreement involving one percent 
of the nation's shoe retailers offended the "central policy of ... the Sherman Act ... 
against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market" 
and thus constituted an "unfair trade practice," violating § 5 of the FTC Act); see also 
Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 (1953) (stating that 
proponents of tying contracts can achieve legitimate objectives by relying upon con-
sumers to choose whether to purchase tied product); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 
448 F.2d 43, 48 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that less restrictive alternatives could achieve 
the same benefits as tying contracts). 
127 See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 74, at 141-44 (describing judicial retreat 
from more extreme manifestations of the inhospitality tradition). 
128 See id. at 144-70. 
129 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) 
("Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition."); id. at 389 
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finding of monopoly power, and the sort of power flowing from mere 
product differentiation does not suffice.130 To define a market, plain-
tiffs must prove the absence of significant "cross-elasticity of demand" 
between the putative product, on the one hand, and various potential 
substitutes, on the other.131 Each of these categories-competition, 
monopoly, monopolistic competition, product differentiation, cross-
elasticity, etc.-was drawn from concepts found and applied in price-
theoretic industrial organization texts. 132 Moreover, the policy con-
clusions, e.g., that mere product differentiation does not constitute 
"monopoly power" for § 2 purposes, reflected the views of price-theo-
retic economists and the workable competition model they articu-
lated.133 Ditto for the view that mere possession of monopoly power 
should not itself offend the antitrust laws.134 
Workable competition also influenced and continues to influ-
ence the definition of conduct that should give rise to liability under 
§ 2. Recall the distinction between: (1) "competition on the merits" 
and resulting monopoly prices, and (2) the use of power to exclude 
rivals. 135 Monopoly pricing, of course, was a price-theoretic concept, 
again drawn from textbooks. While "competition on the merits" did 
not itself hail from price theory, the paradigmatic example of such 
competition, the realization of economies of scale, was a concept 
(defining monopoly power as "a power of controlling prices or unreasonably restrict-
ing competition"); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-11 (1946). 
130 See E./. duPont, 351 U.S. at 391-93 ("[O]ne can theorize that we have monopo-
listic competition in every nonstandard commodity . . . . [T] his power that, let us say, 
automobile or soft-drink manufacturers have over their trademarked products is not 
the power that makes an illegal monopoly."). 
131 Id. at 394-96; see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 
274 n.l2 (2d. Cir. 1979) (" [T]he differen[ce] between price and marginal cost is used 
as an indication of the degree of monopoly power."). 
132 See BAIN, PRICE THEORY, supra note 83, at 126-51 (articulating theory of com-
petitive pricing); id. at 190-210 (articulating theory of monopoly pricing); id. at 
202-05 (explaining that monopolists set price above average total cost); id. at 350-76 
(discussing monopolistic competition and resulting product differentiation); 
OxENFELDT, supra note 116, at 88-90 (endorsing "workable competition" as a more 
useful benchmark for public policy than perfect competition); SciTOVSKY, supra note 
86, at 229-46; STIGLER, CoMPETITIVE PRICE, supra note 85, at 21-22 (describing "com-
petitive price" as one that equaled marginal cost); Edward Mason, Monopoly in Law 
and Economics, 47Yale LJ. 34, 35-36 (1937) (discussing implications of product differ-
entiation for antitrust policy). 
133 See supra note 132 and accompanying text (collecting authorities concluding 
that market power from product differentiation should not give rise to antitrust 
concern). 
134 See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra notes 14, 42, and 55 and accompanying text. 
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drawn from neoclassical price theory, and the workable competition 
model endorsed such competition.136 Finally, the monopoly power 
"used" to impose certain contracts on dealers or consumers and 
thereby disadvantage rivals was also a price-theoretic concept, and 
price theorists often asserted that monopolists used their power to 
impose such agreements.137 
Similar logic drove the test that courts applied to tying con-
tracts.138 The economic power necessary to establish coercive forcing 
and thus a violation was initially defined as the power to induce a pur-
chaser to pay prices or accept other terms that it would not accept in a 
"completely competitive" market.139 Such power included the some-
times modest power that flowed from mere product differentiation 
that accompanied an attractive trademark, for instance.140 Both the 
"competitive market" and the departure from it in the form of power 
over price, including the power conferred by product differentiation, 
were price-theoretic concepts.141 Moreover, courts' conclusion that 
tying contracts were harmful, and that defendants used monopoly 
power, no matter how slight, to impose them, were straightforward 
applications of workable competition. Early decisions invoked the 
work of economists and economically-sophisticated lawyers for the 
proposition that "[t]ying [contracts] serve hardly any purpose beyond 
the suppression of competition."142 Courts cited these scholars for 
136 See George]. Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1J.L. & EcoN. 54 (1958) [hereinaf-
ter Stigler, Economies of Scale]. 
137 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (collecting authorities). 
138 See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text; see also Times-Picayune Publ'g 
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) ("By conditioning his sale of one com-
modity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' inde-
pendent judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates it from the 
competitive stresses of the open market."). 
139 See]efferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46 (1984); U.S. 
Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (holding economic 
power for tying purposes entails power to "raise prices or to require purchasers to 
accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive mar-
ket"); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969); see also 
supra note 116 (collecting authorities governing definition of economic power rele-
vant to analysis of tying contracts). 
140 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 98-101 (collecting sources). 
142 Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
MILLER, supra note 98, at 199-203); see William B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The 
&levance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 
3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REv. 913, 942-54 (1952); Note, Section 3 of the Clayton 
Act-Coexisting Standards of Legality?, 49 CoL. L. REv. 241, 246 (1949); see also supra 
note 139 (collecting decisions holding that presence of tie creates presumption of 
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the conclusion that sellers had to employ market power to "coerce" 
acceptance of such agreements, since no buyer would voluntarily 
accept such limits on its discretion.l43 While courts now require plain-
tiffs to make a meaningful showing of market power to invoke the per 
se rule, they still presume conclusively that ties obtained by firms with 
such power are the result of coercion.144 Finally, similar considera-
tions apparently impelled courts to conclude that contracts between 
manufacturers and dealers were involuntary, thereby allowing dealers 
challenging such agreements to avoid the in pari delicto defense. 145 
It is unremarkable that price theory-the then-current economic 
art-helped courts explain the economic origins and consequences of 
various commercial practices, including non-standard contracts. As 
noted earlier, economic theory has been performing this function for 
at least a century.146 Where these various doctrines were concerned, 
however, price theory seems to have done a little bit more. That is to 
say, price theory's account of these contracts also defined an element 
of the offense of monopolization, namely, the "use of monopoly 
power to foreclose competition"147 as well as the offense of tying, that 
is, the use of "economic power" to "force" a purchaser to do some-
thing it would not do in a competitive market. 148 Courts treated these 
purported economic phenomena as harms cognizable under the anti-
trust laws. Thus, price theory and its workable competition model did 
more than simply tell antitrust courts whether various contracts had 
particular effects: it also informed courts' determination of what 
effects courts should treat as lega!ly relevant. In other words, price 
theory not only supplied the "is" for antitrust: it helped supply the 
"ought" as well. 149 
economic power); see also supra notes 53 and 142 (collecting decisions holding that 
the presence of a tie creates a presumption of economic power); cf. Standard Oil Co. 
of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (citing MILLER, supra note 98, at 
199-203; Note, supra at 246); CoRWIN EowARDs, MAINTAINING CoMPETITION 175-78 
(1949); MYRON W. WATKINS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN BUSI· 
NESS ENTERPRISE, 220-28 (3d ed. 1940). 
143 See sources cited supra in note 139. 
144 See jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-15. 
145 See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (describing judicial rejection of 
in pari delicto defense because of purported disparity of bargaining power between 
manufacturers and dealers). 
146 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
14 7 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 37, 49, and 139 and accompanying text. 
149 See generally Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAYS IN 
PosiTIVE EcoNOMICS 3, 3-7 (1966) (explaining that economic theory cannot itself 
provide the normative content of legal rules);JohnJ. Flynn, The "Is" and the "Ought" of 
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D. Chicago's Elaboration and Internal Critique 
A conclusion that so many antitrust doctrines rest upon price-the-
oretic logic would seem to commend that doctrine to some potential 
critics. After all, the "Rule of Reason" requires courts to employ eco-
nomic theory to determine the origins and consequences of trade 
practices, including contracts.150 Price theory seems the best place to 
start, given that it still forms the basis for much economic inquiry. 
Indeed, Robert Bork, pioneer of the Chicago School of antitrust, 
argued strenuously that price theory was the only legitimate basis for 
developing antitrust doctrine. 151 Judge Richard Posner reached a sim-
ilar conclusion, arguing that many doctrines associated with the inhos-
pitality era, including the ban on tying, were the result of unscientific 
analysis by economically unsophisticated scholars and judges.152 
Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite SeiVice Corp., 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 
1095 (1986) (articulating distinction between descriptive and normative uses of eco-
nomic theory in the antitrust context). For some, the conclusion that price theory 
supplied the "ought" of antitrust may seem unremarkable. After all, scholars have 
been arguing for some time that antitrust regulation should maximize "consumer 
want satisfaction," a concept expressly drawn from neoclassical price theory. See e.g., 
KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 85, at 11-12 (arguing that antitrust law should promote 
efficiency, defined as the arrangement of resources that maximizes "consumer satis-
faction"); Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note 75, at 829-30. However, the reliance on 
price theory identified here goes one step further, employing a construct derived 
from price theory-the exercise of market power to impose exclusionary contracts-
to define subsidiary rules that implement a general command to ban all conduct that 
reduces wealth. Thus, price theory does more than tell courts what to look for. It also 
tells them how to look for it. Cf. THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRUcruRE OF SciENTIFIC 
REvoLUTIONS 59 (1962) (explaining that background expectations determine the 
type of data that a scientist seeks); KARL R. PoPPER, THE LoGIC oF SciENTIFIC D1scov. 
ERY 106 (1961) (explaining how true science "needs points of view, and theoretical 
problems" to drive and inform its fact-gathering); Ronald H. Coase, The New Institu-
tional Economics, 140 j. INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL EcoN. 229 (1984) (chiding 
institutional economists for gathering innumerable facts with no theory to guide 
them as to what was relevant). 
150 See Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note 75 at 805; Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 
74, at 89-92. 
151 See RoBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARJ\oox 117 (1978) [hereinafter, BaRK, 
ANTITRUST PARADox] ("There is no body of knowledge other than conventional price 
theory that can serve as a guide to the effects of business behavior upon consumer 
welfare."); id. at 107-08 (contending that price theory's partial equilibrium trade-off 
model can illustrate all antitrust problems); Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance 
and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE LJ. 950, 952 (1968) (relying upon "basic price theory" 
to argue that minimum resale price maintenance creates "efficient utilization of 
resources"); Robert H. Bork, The Role of Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L. 
]. 21, 24 (1985). 
152 See Posner, supra note 80, at 928. 
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Judge Posner also argued that the Chicago School's contributions to 
antitrust scholarship and doctrine were manifestations of applied 
price theory, which inhospitality scholars did not understand. 153 Per-
haps, taking a cue from these Chicagoans, we should all celebrate 
courts' invocation of price-theoretic concepts and the resulting 
doctrines! 
Still, Chicagoans did anything but celebrate the inhospitality tra-
dition's condemnation of exclusive agreements. In particular, Chi-
cago scholars took issue with the assumption that firms could 
profitably "use" preexisting market power to obtain more. Perhaps 
ironically, Chicagoans built their critique on a more explicit and 
coherent account of how, in fact, a firm could "use" market power to 
impose an agreement. 
According to Chicagoans, a firm with monopoly or market power 
would presumably exercise that power by charging whatever the mar-
ket would bear, pricing above cost to earn a monopoly profit. 154 If, 
however, a firm with power sought to charge a monopoly price and 
impose a discretion-limiting contract, purchasers would interpret the 
additional, onerous term as a premium over the monopoly price.155 A 
firm that charged a monopoly price and imposed a discretion-reduc-
ing contract would see demand for its product and thus output fall 
below the profit-maximizing monopoly level. Thus, Chicagoans 
argued, firms that wished to maximize their profits and impose such 
agreements on trading partners would have to increase output and 
reduce the price of their products. Such a discount from the monop-
oly price would induce the purchaser to forgo its freedom of action 
and ensure that the monopolist could still maximize profits.156 
Thus, while Chicagoans did not set out to offer a model of con-
tract formation or otherwise buttress the "market power" account of 
153 /d. at 932 ("The Chicago school has largely prevailed with respect to its basic 
point: that the proper lens for viewing antitrust problems is price theory."). 
154 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADox, supra note 151, at 306; George]. Stigler, United 
States v. Loew's, Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. CT. REv. 152, 152-53 (1963). 
155 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADox, supra note 151, at 306; PosNER, supra note 52, 
at 173 ("If the price of the tied product is higher than the purchaser would have to 
pay on the open market, the difference will represent an increase in the price of the 
final product or service to him, and he will demand less ... of the tying product."); 
Robert H. Bork & WardS. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 363, 
367 (1965) (noting that a seller can only induce agreement to exclusionary agree-
ment by offering "some extra inducement"). 
156 See Bork & Bowman, supra note 155, at 366-67; see also PosNER, supra note 52, 
at 202-04 (invoking the United Shoe Machinery decision as an exemplar of this phe-
nomenon); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 
Nw. U. L. REv. 281, 290 (1956). 
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exclusionary agreements, they in fact created just such a model. 
According to Chicagoans, a party seeking to induce acceptance of an 
exclusionary agreement would offer its potential trading partner two 
options. The first, high-priced option would leave the trading partner 
with complete discretion to buy or sell however he pleased. The sec-
ond, lower-priced option would require assent to the exclusionary 
provision. If the firm in question possessed monopoly power, then 
presumably the price for the first, "no exclusion" option would equal 
the firm's profit-maximizing, monopoly price. The second option, on 
the other hand, would presumably entail a discount from the monop-
oly price. In this way, one might say, the defendant could "use" its 
monopoly power to induce acceptance of contractual terms its part-
ner would not otherwise accept. 157 
Nonetheless, while Chicagoans explained how the use of power 
to impose contracts was possible, they also argued that such a strategy 
would usually constitute a zero-sum game for the monopolist. For one 
thing, the profits lost from discounting to induce acceptance of such 
agreements would offset or exceed the gains from maintaining a 
monopoly price. 158 Moreover, nothing would prevent a firm's rivals 
from offering purchasers similar inducements.159 Finally, they said, 
purchasers would understand that exclusionary agreements could 
enhance their supplier's market power and thus injure them in the 
future. As a result, purchasers subject to such provisions could 
demand a pro-tanto price reduction to compensate them for any 
157 See supra notes 20, 71, 103, and 116 and accompanying text (explaining Chi-
cago's argument that a monopolist seeking to impose an exclusive dealing contract 
would have to reduce its price or offer another inducement to the party to be bound 
by the agreement); see also infra note 164 and accompanying text (articulating a price 
differential model to explain the formation of non-standard agreements that reduce 
transaction costs); WILLIAMSON, supra note 105, at 33 (explaining how firms can 
employ price differentials to induce acceptance of non-standard contracts). 
158 See PosNER, supra note 52, at 202-05 (explaining how price cuts necessary to 
"impose" exclusive dealing would dissipate any monopoly profits that manufacturers 
might otherwise earn due to such agreements); Director & Levi, supra note 156, at 
290 ("Firms which have some monopoly power over prices and output can impose 
coercive restrictions on suppliers and customers. In the normal case, however, they 
will lose revenue if they do impose such restrictions, and this casts some doubt on how 
prevalent or continued the practice would be. Such firms would lose revenue because 
they cannot both obtain the advantage of the original power and impose additional 
coercive restrictions so as to increase their monopoly power. The coercive restrictions 
on customers are possible only if the price which would be charged without the 
restriction is reduced."). 
159 See BaRK, supra note 151, at 304 (arguing that rivals can presumably meet 
monopolist's discount that induces exclusivity); Bork & Bowman, supra note 155, at 
366-67 (same). 
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expected enhancement of monopoly power. 160 Thus, any effort by a 
monopolist to expand its power in this way would be futile. 161 
There was, however, one exception to this futility conclusion: 
price discrimination. According to Chicagoans, monopolists could 
employ tying contracts to capture purchasers' full consumer sur-
plus.162 A firm with a monopoly over, say, adding machines could 
require all purchasers also to purchase the punch cards such 
machines employ when performing calculations.163 By charging 
slightly less than the monopoly price for the machine, and slightly 
more than the competitive price for such cards, a monopolist could 
ensure that purchasers that used the machine more intensely ulti-
mately pay more for the service, namely mechanical adding.164 In this 
way, it was said, monopolists could exercise their power to impose pro-
visions that helped them exercise even more. 
160 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADox, supra note 151, at 304-05 ("It is important to 
see that Alpha [the manufacturer that obtains an exclusive dealing contract] must 
offer something to the food canners to get them to sign the requirements contracts, 
and that it must offer that something for the life of the contract, which means that, in 
terms of cutting out rivals, the contract offers Alpha no advantages it would not have 
had without the contract. The advantage of the contract must be the creation of 
efficiency ... and the fear of foreclosure is chimerical."). 
161 See PosNER, supra note 52, at 203-04; Director & Levi, supra note 156, at 290. 
162 See PosNER, supra note 52, at 173-75; Director & Levi, supra note 156, at 290; 
see also Frank H. Knight, Demand and Supply and Price, in THE EcoNOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION 67, 94 (1951) (contending that monopolists can price discriminate by "rent[ing] 
the monopolized good and charg[ing] in proportion to the amount used instead of 
selling it outright. This can be done by selling supplies for it at a monopoly price."). 
163 This example is not hypothetical. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 
(1936) (evaluating requirement that purchasers of adding machines also purchase 
punch cards). 
164 See PosNER, supra note 52, at 173 ("By providing the computer at cost and 
selling each card at a monopoly price, the computer monopolist can vary the charge 
for computation according to the amount of each purchaser's use."); Stigler, supra 
note 154, at 153-54. It should be noted that some scholars outside the Chicago 
School recognized that firms with market power could use price differentials to 
impose tying contracts. See KAYSEN & TuRNER, supra note 85, at 154 (noting that ties 
induced by sufficient price reductions are indistinguishable from outright ties); id. at 
157; Alfred E. Kahn, A Legal And Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman and Clayton 
Acts, 63 YALE LJ. 293, 322-24 (1954) (treating tie obtained via price differentials as 
exercise of market power); Turner, supra note 107, at 63 (noting that a discount off 
the price of a tying product involves the exercise of market power where tied product 
is priced above the competitive level); id. at 66 (noting that a price reduction induc-
ing tie is exercise of market power). However, these scholars did not model aU such 
agreements as resulting from such differentials, and they rejected Chicago's policy 
conclusions. 
THE MARKET POWER OF CONTRACT FORMATION 
Chicagoans did not assert that all such contracts facilitated price 
discrimination. In fact Chicagoans contended that such agreements 
often produced efficiencies, although this conclusion almost always 
took the form of an inference, drawn from the assumption that such 
contracts could not protect or accentuate market power. 165 At the 
same time, Chicagoans offered no explanation for how parties formed 
such pro-competitive agreements, seeming to concede that propo-
nents "imposed" them on unwilling trading partners.166 Even George 
Stigler, stalwart of the Chicago School, opined that sellers could only 
obtain agreement to tying and exclusive dealing contracts by exercis-
ing market power.I67 
To be sure, the equation of Chicago's "price differential" model 
of contract formation with the "exercise" or "use" of market power is 
not free from doubt. As noted earlier, the actual formation of the 
contract and resulting transactions would entail a price below the 
monopoly price, and output above the level a profit-maximizing 
monopolist would otherwise choose.168 It therefore seems awkward to 
characterize such agreements as a "use" or "exercise" of monopoly 
power. Still, one might characterize the agreement in question as the 
result of a threat to exercise such power, by selling the product unen-
cumbered by a restraint at the monopoly price. Thus, while the result-
ing agreements are not ipso facto an exercise of monopoly power, it is 
not much of a stretch to attribute them to such an exercise. 
E. Legal Realism 
Price theory was not the only possible external influence on anti-
trust doctrine during the inhospitality era; there were other possible 
165 See BaRK, ANTITRUST PARADox, supra note 151, at 304-05 (contending that 
exclusive dealing could not produce harm and thus "must" produce efficiencies); PoS-
NER, supra note 52, at 204 (concluding that exclusive leasing provisions in the United 
Shoe Machinery decision could not produce harm and were thus likely efficient); see 
also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market 
Division, 75YALELJ. 373,388-81,389-90 (1966) [hereinafterBork, TheRuleofReason 
(part II)] (articulating argument that absence of market power suggests that a restraint 
produces benefits). 
166 See PosNER, supra note 52, at 145-65 (stating repeatedly that manufacturers 
"impose" vertical restrictions upon dealers); id. at 175 (asserting that firms "impos[e]" 
beneficial ties). Indeed Robert Bork, who argued vigorously that intrabrand 
restraints were beneficial efforts to overcome dealer free riding, nonetheless implied 
that dealers do not agree to such restraints. See Robert H. Bork, A Reply to Professors 
Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE LJ. 731, 739 (1967) ("This argument [in favor of resale 
price maintenance] rests upon the idea of consumer sovereignty. It does not depend 
upon the notion that the resellers may be said to have 'agreed' to r.p.m."). 
167 Stigler, Preventative Antitrust Policy, supra note 116, at 176. 
168 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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determinants as well. In particular, the Legal Realism movement 
gathered steam during this period and exercised significant influence 
over the manner in which courts and scholars assessed legal rules and 
relationships. 169 Realism offered a critique of classical laissez-faire 
jurisprudence, which treated markets as inherently competitive and 
contracts as generally voluntary efforts to advance the interests of both 
parties.170 Realists admonished courts to look behind formal relation-
ships, particularly market relationships, and examine their true empir-
ical nature when constructing legal rules that addressed them. 171 
Perhaps Realism, and not price theory, explains the "market power" 
model of contract formation and various resulting doctrines. 172 
According to Realists, many apparently voluntary market relation-
ships were in fact "coercive," for two distinct reasons. First, one party 
to a contractual relationship often possessed "bargaining power," 
which Realists sometimes equated with market or monopoly power. 
In these cases, Realists said, the stronger party could impose contrac-
tual terms on unwilling parties.173 Second, and more fundamentally, 
Realists noted that all contractual bargains depended upon the own-
ership of private property, which the state created and protected with 
force. 174 As a result, any bargain resulted from state coercion, without 
which one party could simply occupy and use "the other's" property 
without consent. 175 Many Realists even refer to private contracts as 
"private legislation. "176 
Certainly early antitrust jurisprudence reflected the strong influ-
ence of classical political economy and derivative liberty of contract, 
thereby presenting a tempting target for Realists. 177 Under this 
169 See Page, Legal Realism, supra note 28, at 1. 
170 See Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1, 
15-34 (1999) [hereinafter Meese, Liberty and Antitrust]. 
171 See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454 (1909). 
172 See Page, Legal Realism, supra note 28 (exploring Realism's influence over anti-
trust doctrine during this period). 
173 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943). 
174 See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLuM. L. REv. 
603 (1943); see also BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE AsSAULT ON LAissEz FAIRE 
76-89 (1998) (noting the state's inevitable role in shaping economic life). 
175 See Hale, supra note 174, at 604-05; id. at 625 ("The market value of a property 
or a service is merely a measure of the strength of the bargaining power of the person 
who owns the one or renders the other, under the particular legal rights with which 
the law endows him, and the legal restrictions which it places on others."). 
176 See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmak-
ing, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1971). 
177 See, e.g., Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 170, at 34-68 (detailing influ-
ence of liberty of contract and classical political economy on early Sherman Act juris-
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approach, contracts were presumed "normal" or "ordinary," unless 
the plaintiff could show that they produced "monopoly or its conse-
quences," i.e., an exercise of market power leading to higher prices, 
reduced output, or reduced quality. 178 Exclusionary agreements, 
even if entered by a monopolist, were no exception. Such contracts, it 
was said, were completely voluntary and reflected each party's judg-
ment that the agreements worked to its respective advantage.179 They 
were thus lawful absent proof that they produced the consequences of 
monopoly without offsetting benefits. 1B0 
Subsequent decisions employing the "abuse of power" formula-
tion rejected various premises of classical political economy. Moreo-
ver, courts employing this formulation reached results that Realists 
would have found congenial. Indeed, at least one leading realist, 
Thurmond Arnold, expressly invoked concerns about the coercion of 
dealers and others when calling for more aggressive antitrust regula-
tion of the supplier I dealer relationship. 181 
At the same time, the doctrinal landscape that ultimately 
emerged during the inhospitality era and survives to this day was more 
consistent with price theory than it was with Legal Realism. Realism, 
after all, merely counseled courts to examine relevant circumstances, 
but offered no explicit theory guiding such consideration. Price the-
ory, on the other hand, with its theory of barriers to entry, helped 
explain why firms could possess and exercise market power without 
state assistance, thereby suggesting that private markets could pro-
duce "coercive" results. 182 Moreover, none of the antitrust doctrines 
prudence); William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 
TuL. L. REv. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Page, Ideological Conflict]; see also Meese, Rule of 
Reason, supra note 74, at 83-89 (detailing evolution of Rule of Reason from 1890 to 
1911, including the influence of liberty of contract considerations). 
178 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
179 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918) (rt;jecting chal-
lenge to exclusionary lease provisions entered by monopolist); see also FTC v. Sinclair 
Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923) (rejecting challenge to tying contract); FTC v. Gratz, 
253 U.S. 421 (1920) (rejecting similar challenge to tying contract). 
180 See United Shoe Mach., 247 U.S. at 61-65 (rejecting challenge to exclusionary 
agreement because the contract made sense regardless of exclusionary impact). 
181 See Page, Legal Realism, supra note 28, at 19-23 (detailing influence of Arnold's 
views on enforcement policy). 
182 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 75, at 287-91 (explaining how the rise of price 
theory convinced courts that market outcomes could produce coercive results absent 
state-created barriers to entry); see also Meese, Liberty and Antitrust, supra note 170, at 
43-80 (demonstrating that the Supreme Court sustained regulation of private cartels 
because of a changed understanding of their economic impact); Page, Ideological Con-
flict, supra note 177, at 44-48 (offering a similar explanation for the Court's willing-
ness to sustain antitrust regulation that apparently abridged contractual liberty). 
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discussed above took Realist insights to their logical conclusion and 
declared all market relationships "coercive" because of the implicit 
involvement of state force. For instance, the "use of power" offense 
under § 2 required proof that the defendant possessed significant 
monopoly power.183 Also, the per se rule against tying contracts 
required proof that the defendant in fact possessed "economic power" 
in the tying product market. 184 To be sure, Supreme Court dicta 
sometimes claimed that the mere existence of numerous ties sug-
gested that proponents of agreements possessed the market power 
necessary to impose them.185 However, this conclusion flowed from 
price theory's inability to identify a non-coercive method of forming 
such agreements.186 Even here, however, the Court qualified these 
assertions by referencing defendants' market advantages and sug-
gesting that defendants could avoid inferences of market power by 
proving that the restraints produced benefits explaining the pur-
chaser's (voluntary) agreement.l87 Finally, as explained earlier, the 
Court retained the in pari delicto defense for those cases in which par-
ties bargained on an equal footing, contrary to the apparent implica-
tions of Legal Realism. Iss 
In summary, and more globally, it would be impossible to square 
antitrust's preference for atomistic competition with Realism's conclu-
sion that even contracts entered in competitive markets were coer-
cive.189 Inhospitality era courts repeatedly invoked a "competitive 
market" as the summum bonum of antitrust policy-the ideal state of 
183 See United States v. E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 
(1956) (holding that market power of the type created by product differentiation 
does not in fact give rise to the sort of "monopoly power" policed under § 2). 
184 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958); see also supra 
notes 37-43 and accompanying text. 
185 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969); Nmthern 
Pacific, 356 U.S. at 7-8. 
186 See infra Part III. 
187 See Nmthern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 7 ("[Defendant's] land [the tying product] was 
strategically located in checkerboard fashion amid private holdings . . . . Not only the 
testimony of various witnesses but common sense makes it evident that this particular 
land was often prized by those who purchased or leased it and was frequently essential 
to their business activities."); id. at 7-8 (finding numerous ties evidence of economic 
power "at least where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for the exis-
tence of these restraints"). 
188 See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (describing law governing in pari 
delicto); see also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-41 
(1968) (plurality opinion); id. at 145 (White,]., concurring). 
189 See Hale, supra note 174 at 626-36. 
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economic affairs from which non-standard agreements departed. 190 
This market, however, itself depended upon common law institutions 
of contract, property and tort; even perfect competition requires, as 
its foundation, well-defined property rights. 191 Absent such property, 
there would be no production, trading or resulting prices.192 And yet, 
according to Realists, the specter of state force would render all bar-
gains arising in such markets "coercive." Presumably Realists would 
have said the same thing about all tying contracts, exclusive dealing 
contracts, and other non-standard agreements. Indeed, during this 
era, antitrust law even allowed firms to achieve monopoly, via "compe-
tition on the merits."193 In the end, then, price theory and the policy 
prescriptions that it offered, and not Legal Realism, set the bounda-
ries of antitrust regulation during this period, including those doc-
trines that depended upon the market power model of contract 
formation. 
III. CRITIQUE OF PRICE THEORY (BoTH HARvARD AND CHICAGO) 
As explained earlier, scholars and jurists have invoked a "market 
power" model of contract formation when interpreting exclusionary 
agreements. Indeed, significant current antitrust doctrine rests upon 
the assumption that firms use market power to coerce others into 
"agreeing" to exclusionary provisions. To be sure, the Chicago School 
took issue with these doctrines, arguing that using power to impose 
such provisions cannot increase a.monopolist's profits. Instead, Chi-
cago said, such agreements are either efforts at (efficient) price dis-
crimination or methods of minimizing the cost of generating (usually 
190 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); FTC v. Brown 
Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (articulating "central policy of ... § 1 of the 
Sherman Act ... against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an 
open market" (citations omitted)); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 
(1959); Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) ("Basic 
to the faith that a free economy best promotes the public weal is that goods must 
stand the cold test of competition; that the public, acting through the market's imper-
sonal judgment, shall allocate the Nation's resources .... "); see also United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (maintaining that the Sherman Act 
is a "charter of freedom" ensuring an atomistic marketplace). 
191 See supra note 85 and accompanying text; infra notes 192-94 and accompany-
ing text (collecting additional sources for this proposition). 
192 See BARZEL, supra note 85, at 11-13 (stating that perfect competition depends 
upon perfect specification of property rights and costless transactions); Harold Dem-
setz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. L. & EcoN. 11, 18 (1964) 
(explaining that private property enables private markets that reveal social values via 
prices). 
193 See supra notes 14 and 42 and accompanying text. 
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undefined) efficiencies. However, Chicago did not question the mar-
ket power model of contract formation, but ironically offered a more 
precise account of what such imposition entailed. 
As shown below, price theory's model of contract formation rests 
upon numerous outmoded assumptions-what Ronald Coase would 
call "blackboard economics"-about the nature of markets and the 
firms and consumers that inhabit them. A more realistic paradigm, 
transaction cost economics ("TCE"), offers a superior framework for 
interpreting non-standard agreements, including those that exclude 
rivals from portions of the marketplace. TCE suggests that many non-
standard agreements are contractual rearrangements of property 
rights that reduce the cost of relying upon markets to conduct eco-
nomic activity by preventing or attenuating prospective opportunistic 
behavior by the proponent's trading partners.194 This characteriza-
tion suggests an alternative model of contract formation, so-called 
"Coasean Bargains" that have nothing to do with market power, and 
are instead examples of voluntary integration that redefines the par-
ties' rights and obligations, indistinguishable from garden variety con-
tracts that courts regularly enforce. Similar logic suggests that even 
exclusionary agreements that reduce welfare are equally voluntary as 
between the parties to them .. 
A. TCE and a New Account of Non-Standard Contracts 
Price theory is no longer the sole basis for industrial organization 
or antitrust policy. Over the past few decades, economists and anti-
trust scholars have constructed a new economic framework, TCE, to 
rival price theory's interpretation of commercial phenomena.195 TCE 
has challenged price theory's technological conception of the firm 
and offered benign explanations for partial integration in the form of 
non-standard contracts that price theory and the inhospitality tradi-
tion treated as harmful expressions of market power. 
Practitioners of TCE examined the consequences of conducting 
economic activity in an atomistic market, where transactions take 
place unconstrained by nonstandard agreements. 196 According to 
TCE, atomistic transacting entails a cost, what practitioners of TCE 
194 See Demsetz, supra note 192, at 25-26; see also BARZEL, supra note 85, at 14 
(explaining the centrality of contract to defining the boundaries of property rights 
and obligations in a free economy). 
195 See WILUAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 15. 
196 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (describing this assumption of the 
perfect competition model); see also WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 
105, at 3 (explaining how TCE treats the "transaction ... as the basic unit of analysis" 
(citation omitted)); id. at 6, 18, 88 (same). 
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dubbed a "transaction cost."197 Scholars found these costs in certain 
departures from perfect competition. Ronald Coase famously began 
the transaction cost movement in 1937 by explaining the origin of 
firms, institutions that price theory had either taken for granted or 
treated as arising from technological considerations. 198 Reliance on 
the market, Coase said, entailed bargaining and information costs, 
costs that actors could avoid by conducting economic activity within a 
firm, a particular type of non-standard contract, thereby reducing the 
overall cost of production. 199 Others extended Coase's analysis, 
emphasizing different departures from perfect competition, such as 
the passage of time, investments specific to a particular activity, and 
the risk that one's trading partners will take advantage of the relation-
ship by behaving in an opportunistic manner.200 Given these condi-
tions, they said, reliance upon an atomistic market could give rise to a 
197 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 387 (1937) [hereinafter, 
Coase, Nature of the Firm (EcoNOMICA)]; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETs AND 
HIERARCHIES (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS] (explaining the concept of 
transaction costs). 
198 See Coase, Nature of the Firm (EcoNOMICA), supra note 197; see also R. H. Coase, 
The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 713, 714 ( 1992) [hereinafter 
Coase, Institutional Structure] (stating that the price-theoretic "economist does not 
interest himself in the internal arrangements within organizations but only in what 
happens on the market, [that is] the purchase of factors of production, and the sale 
of the goods that these factors produce."); Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm 
&visited, 4J.L. EcoN. & ORe. 141, 143 (1988) ('"Firm' in the theory of price is simply 
a rhetorical device adopted to facilitate discussion of the price system."); Lionel Rob-
bins, The Representative Firm, 38 EcoN. J. 387, 389-90 (1928) (explaining that the rep-
resentative firm in Marshall's "Principles of Economics" was an economic construct, 
independent of actual legal structure); supra note 105 and accompanying text 
(explaining how price theory treated firms as having technological origins). 
199 See Coase, Nature of the Firm (EcoNOMICA), supra note 197, at 390 ("The main 
reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of 
using the price mechanism."); id. at 389 & n.3 (noting that "planning" that takes 
place within the firm is voluntary and pursuant to contract); id. at 391 ("A factor of 
production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with 
the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm . . . . For this series of 
contracts is substituted one."). 
200 · See WILLIAMSON, MARKETs, supra note 197, at 83-84 (contending that relation-
ship-specific investment and resulting risk of opportunism can give rise to complete 
vertical integration); Coase, Nature of the Firm (EcoNOMICA) supra note 197, at 390-91 
(focusing on bargaining and discovery costs); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Deter-
minants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 356 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Klein, "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements] (examining the impact of relationship-
specific investments on extent and type of contractual and complete integration); 
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Con-
tracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297 (1978) (examining the impact of relationship-
specific investments on extent and type of contractual and complete integration). 
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risk of opportunism, a risk that "unified contracting" in the form of 
complete integration could eliminate.201 These scholars agreed with 
Coase's conclusion that "the firm" was a special non-standard contract 
giving its owners special control rights over their property and 
employees, rights that eliminated or reduced the risk of opportu-
nism.202 While price theorists had themselves recognized (and 
emphasized) certain departures from perfect competition, particu-
larly when constructing and applying the workable competition 
model, they had not recognized the departures that gave rise to trans-
action costs, departures they often excluded by hypothesis while 
examining the implications of other departures. 203 
TCE thus offered a more convincing explanation for the exis-
tence of firms than price theory's technological account, as the latter 
simply explained why certain activity should be conducted in close 
proximity, e.g., "under the same roof," and not why actors should also 
bring activities under common ownership. 204 Practitioners of TCE 
also offered benign explanations for partial contractual integration. 
These scholars argued that such non-standard agreements could over-
come market failures by, for instance, better aligning the incentives of 
vertically-related trading partners. Perhaps most famously, Robert 
Bork and Lester Telser argued that certain vertical restraints could 
overcome a failure in the market for promotional services by ensuring 
that dealers would recoup the benefits of their (specific) promotional 
investments.205 Subsequently, scholars sought additional "market fail-
ure" explanations for non-standard contracts, including contracts pre-
viously deemed "exclusionary" and coercive. For instance, scholars 
argued that certain tying contracts could help franchisors combat free 
201 See infra note 202 (collecting authorities). 
202 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 78 (equating inter-
nal organization with "unified contracting"); Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 
4J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 181, 195 (1988) (noting that parties could replicate the various 
control properties associated with the firm by contract). 
203 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
204 See Victor P. Goldberg, Production }unctions and Transaction Costs, 397, in IssuEs 
IN CONTEMPORARY MICROECONOMICS & WELFARE (George R. Feiwel, ed. 1985) 
(explaining that technical economies cannot explain boundaries of firms because, 
absent transaction costs, such economies can "be achieved equally well if the factors 
of production are owned by independent individuals."). 
205 See Bork, The Rule of Reason (part II), supra note 165 (contending that exclusive 
territories can ensure that dealers recoup the benefits of promotional expenditures); 
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960) 
(contending that minimum resale price maintenance can ensure that dealers inter-
nalize the benefits of promotional expenditures). 
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riding by ensuring that franchisees purchased high quality inputs.206 
Others argued that some tying contracts could prevent breakdowns 
caused by inferior inputs, breakdowns that purchasers might other-
wise attribute to some imagined fault in the manufacturer's own prod-
uct, and thus protect the manufacturer's goodwill. 207 
Others offered transaction cost explanations for exclusive dealing 
agreements. Some argued that such contracts could encourage rela-
tionship-specific investment, by ensuring that firms making such 
investments would have a guaranteed outlet for their products.208 
Others offered additional explanations, including the claim that such 
agreements could create a sort of property right allowing manufactur-
ers to reap the rewards of their promotional expenditures. 2°9 While 
these scholars did not always articulate explanations in explicit trans-
206 See Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying 
Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 345 (1985) (arguing that franchise tying contracts can pro-
tect goodwill of the franchise system against opportunistic shirking by franchisees). 
207 See, e.g., PosNER, supra note 52, at 175. Others argued that requiring purchas-
ers of complex products also to purchase repair and maintenance services from the 
manufacturer would enable the manufacturer to produce information about the 
product, while independent service organizations would lack incentives to produce 
such information. See Meese, Tying, supra note 41, at 65-66. 
Private parties successfully articulated the "goodwill protection" rationale for 
tying contracts before the advent of workable competition. See, e.g., FfC v. Sinclair 
Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923) (sustaining tie on this basis). However, price theory led 
the Supreme Court repeatedly to reject this rationale for tying contracts, because less 
restrictive means could supposedly produce identical benefits. See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co., 
Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 
134 (1936). 
208 See Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher 
Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 199, 201 (1988); see also 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 287 (6th Cir. 1898) (explaining 
how exclusive grant to sleeping car company to serve railroad line could induce the 
company to make specific investments); Bork, The Rule of Reason (part II), supra note 
165, at 398-402 (same); Milton Handler, Statement Before The Small Business Administra-
tion, 11 ANTITRUST BuLL. 417, 424-25 (1966) (suggesting such a rationale before 
economists did). 
209 See Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1982) (contending 
that exclusive dealing contracts could prevent dealers from promoting inferior 
brands and thus free-riding on manufacturer's promotion). Such a strategy could 
enhance dealers' profits if a manufacturer expended more per unit of output on 
promotion than its competitors, with the result that a dealer could enhance its mar-
gins by steering customers toward products with lower wholesale prices. /d. at 7; see 
also Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United States Versus United Shoe Machin-
ery Corporation: On the Merits, 36J.L. & EcoN. 33, 42-43,67-68 (1993) (offering a 
different transaction cost rationale for exclusive dealing); John Shepard Wiley Jr. et 
al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REv. 693, 710 (1990) (offering a different 
transaction cost rationale for exclusive dealing). 
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action cost terms, they in fact attempted to explain how non-standard 
contracts reduced the costs of reliance upon an unbridled market, by 
redefining background property rights and contractual obligations.210 
Practitioners of TCE articulated a presumption that partial and com-
plete contractual integration was designed to reduce the cost of 
transacting. 211 
Thus, TCE did more than undermine price theory's technologi-
cal conception of the firm and its concomitant account of complete 
vertical integration. The new paradigm also questioned price theory's 
more fundamental assumption that all efficiencies were technological 
and thus realized after the purchase of inputs and before the sale of a 
product to dealers or consumers.212 By showing that contracts reach-
ing beyond the firm and restraining an unbridled market could over-
come market failures and enhance resource allocation, TCE 
demonstrated that some efficiencies are "contractual" in nature. 213 
Moreover, TCE established that such efficiencies could arise over 
time, long after the production and sale of the product in question. 
B. TCE and Contract Formation 
The recognition that many non-standard contracts produced sig-
nificant benefits by overcoming market failures led courts to reject 
numerous doctrines associated with the inhospitality tradition.214 In 
particular, courts overruled or narrowed various decisions that had 
condemned, as unlawful per se, various non-standard contracts that 
were ancillary to otherwise valid transactions or relationships. 215 
Courts also softened their approach to exclusionary agreements 
210 See Meese, Market Failure, supra note 103, at 52-54 (explaining how Telser's 
work did not invoke the transaction cost paradigm or refer to Coase). 
211 See WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 28 (articulating 
this rebuttable presumption); see also R. H. Coase, An Overoiew of the Antitrust Laws, in 
THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 26 (1988) (noting the ubiquity of transaction 
costs and resulting market failures in the real world). 
212 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that price theory 
assumed that efficiencies were technological in nature and arose within the firm, 
before passage of title to the firm's product). 
213 See e.g., Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 74, at 134-41 (explaining how TCE 
identified various contractual efficiencies produced by non-standard contracts). 
214 See id. at 141-44 (detailing judicial rejection of various per se rules). 
215 See id; see also, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overturning per se 
ban on maximum resale price maintenance); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (narrowing per se ban on horizontal price fixing and out-
put limitation); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (reversing 
per se ban on non-price vertical restraints); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 
185 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying Rule of Reason to horizontal restraint). 
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entered by monopolists.216 Still, neither these decisions nor TCE 
itself seemed to question the market power model of contract forma-
tion. Indeed, each benign account implicitly assumed that propo-
nents of such agreements possessed market power, if only from 
product differentiation. So, for instance, the claim that minimum 
resale price maintenance or exclusive territories could encourage 
optimal promotion by dealers depended upon an assumption that 
manufacturers were selling a differentiated product and thus pos-
sessed modest market power. 217 Ditto for claims that exclusive deal-
ing facilitated manufacturers' production of promotional 
information.218 In a similar way, of course, practitioners of price the-
ory had expressly recognized that practices that led to or preserved 
market power, including product differentiation and the realization 
of economies of scale, could simultaneously produce benefits that out-
weighed the harm associated with such power.219 Professor William-
son formalized this result in 1968 by applying the so-called "partial 
equilibrium trade-off model," concluding that a small reduction in 
production costs would usually offset whatever harm flowed from the 
exercise of market power.220 Indeed, in 1978, Robert Bork would 
argue that this model should form the basis for the analysis of all anti-
trust problems. 221 
To be sure, Ronald Coase expressly claimed that a desire to 
reduce transaction costs explained integration independent of 
216 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (explaining that courts applying 
§ 2 now allow monopolists to offer justifications for otherwise unlawful exclusionary 
agreements). 
217 See Telser, supra note 205, at 94-96 (explaining why this account of minimum 
rpm depends upon the presence of product differentiation and resulting market 
power); see al5o Bork, The Rule of Reason (part II), supra note 165, at 431-34 (explaining 
how sales effort induced by such agreements facilitated local advertising associated 
with national trademarks). 
218 See Marvel, supra note 209, at 8-11. 
219 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
220 See Williamson, Welfare Tradeoffs, supra note 98, at 21-23. While Williamson 
was the first to formalize this insight, the law's historical preference for "competition 
on the merits," supported by scholars in the "workable competition" school, 
depended upon an implicit assumption that, say, economies of scale that might lead 
to or protect a monopoly produced benefits that outweighed the resulting harms. 
See, e.g., BAIN, PrucE THEORY, supra note 83, at 208-209 (explaining that monopoly 
can produce more output than a competitive market due to economies of scale or 
other efficiencies); Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regula-
tory Policies, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1207 (1969). 
221 See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 151, at 107-08. 
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monopoly considerations and that such integration was voluntary.222 
At the same time he did not, in his published writings anyway, explain 
how this voluntary integration took place.223 Moreover, many expo-
nents of the transaction cost approach were members of the Chicago 
School.224 Despite their articulation and application of transaction 
cost principles, these scholars repeatedly endorsed "price theory" as 
the appropriate foundation for antitrust policy and invoked the mar-
ket power model of contract formation in support of their argument 
against inhospitality era doctrines hostile to exclusionary agree-
ments.225 It should come as no surprise, then, that these and other 
practitioners of TCE were content simply with demonstrating that 
non-standard contracts produced significant benefits and did not 
overtly question price theory's account of contract formation.226 For 
these scholars, the mere exercise of market power to "impose" an 
agreement would not itself suggest that the agreement reduced wel-
fare. Indeed, when "challenged" by the argument that manufacturers 
"imposed" minimum resale price maintenance upon dealers against 
their will, Robert Bark's response was, basically, "so what?"227 What 
222 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4 J. L. EcoN. & ORe. 19, 26-27 
(1988) ("In the early 1930s I was looking for an explanation for the existence of the 
finn which did not depend on monopoly. I found it, of course, in transactions 
costs."); Coase, Nature of the Firm (EcoNOMICA), supra note 197, at 389 n.3 ("[F]inns 
arise voluntarily because they represent a more efficient method of organizing 
production."). 
223 But see infra note 267 and accompanying text (discussing Coase's 1930s private 
correspondence on the subject). 
224 Robert Bork and Richard Posner were the chief examples. 
225 See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text (discussing assertions by Robert 
Bork and Richard Posner that price theory was the only appropriate methodological 
foundation for antitrust doctrine); supra note 124-27 and accompanying text 
(describing Chicago School's opposition to inhospitality era doctrines); see also Oliver 
E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics and Organization?, 1 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 369, 
383 (2005) [hereinafter Williamson, Why Law?] ("' [D]espite references by Chi-
cagoans to 'price theory,' Chicago's approach to vertical restraints has never rested 
upon ... price theory. Instead, the Chicago approach to vertical restraints is an appli-
cation of [NIE/TCE reasoning].'" (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 
UCLA L. REv. 143, 203 (1997))). 
226 The one exception, it should be noted, was Professor Williamson, who 
expressly articulated a model of forming beneficial non-standard contracts. See infra 
note 306 and accompanying text. He did not, however, contrast this account with 
price theory's market power model. 
227 Bork, A Reply To Professors, supra note 166, at 739 ("This argument [in favor of 
minimum resale price maintenance] rests upon the idea of consumer sovereignty. It 
does not depend in any way upon a notion that the resellers may be said to have 
'agreed' to r.p.m."). It is of course ironic that Bork would imply that minimum r.p.m. 
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mattered for Bork and others was the result of such agreements, and 
not how they were formed. 228 
Not everyone, however, believes that the process of contract for-
mation is irrelevant from the perspective of antitrust doctrine. As 
explained above, courts still treat certain non-standard contracts as 
expressions of market power and assume that the use of power to 
impose such agreements itself offends the Sherman Act, at least 
absent some justification.229 Moreover, even if a defendant proves 
that a restraint produces benefits, courts assume that the benefits 
coexist with harms associated with the use of power to impose the 
restraint.230 Also, courts still reject arguments that dealers are willing 
participants in anticompetitive contracts because sellers purportedly 
employ market power to impose such agreements.231 As a result, 
proof that such contracts are not the result of market power could 
have significant implications for antitrust doctrine. 
In fact, the application of TCE in light of other economic devel-
opments undermines the claim that non-standard agreements, includ-
ing those that cause harm, are necessarily the result of market power. 
As noted earlier, TCE begins with the claim that reliance upon the 
sort of atomistic market imagined by price theory-transacting-
entails a "transaction cost."232 Complete vertical integration and 
other non-standard contracts, it is said, can overcome or reduce these 
costs.233 
These transaction costs do not fall upon the public at large but 
are instead internalized by actors that rely upon market transacting. 
As an economic matter, these costs are indistinguishable from other 
costs of production, such as the cost of steel, electricity, or man-
power.234 To be sure, and unlike technological efficiencies, some 
transaction costs may only manifest themselves at some point in the 
future, long after the purchase and sale that gave rise to the non-stan-
dard agreement in the first place. This is particularly so when the 
was the result of coercion. Mter all, one year earlier, Bork had argued that such 
agreements were examples of contractual integration of the sort identified by Ronald 
Coase in his pathbreaking work. See Bork, The Rule of Reason (part II), supra note 165, 
at 472-73 (citing Coase, Nature of the Firm (EcoNOMICA), supra note 197, at 386). 
228 See PosNER, ANTITRUST LAw, supra note 52, at 145-65 (referring repeatedly to 
the "imposition" of restrictions by manufacturers). 
229 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text. 
232 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
233 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
234 SeeCariJ. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22]. L. & EcoN. 141,143-150 
(1979). 
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transaction cost flows from specific investments and takes the form of 
prospective opportunism at the hands of a trading partner. 235 Nonethe-
less, a firm deciding whether to rely upon the market will still internal-
ize these costs, just as a firm internalizes the prospective "cost" of 
offering a warranty that it must honor in the future. 236 
At the same time, such costs differ from other costs of production 
in an important respect: they are not necessarily exogenous to the 
firm that incurs them.237 To be sure, such costs only arise because 
information and bargaining costs prevent parties from anticipating 
and guarding against them ex ante, and they often take the form of 
tort-like opportunism by trading partners.238 Nonetheless, the pros-
pect and magnitude of such costs can depend upon the nature of the 
institutional framework within which the firm operates and transacts 
with others. 239 Roughly speaking, this framework will have two com-
ponents: (1) background rules of the game, such as the law of prop-
erty and contract, promulgated and enforced by the state, and (2) 
contractual provisions that parties adopt that change those back-
ground rules. 240 By altering background rules, the state can alter this 
framework and thus alter the costs of transacting. 241 In the same way, 
private parties can alter these costs by altering the contractual rules 
that govern the transaction going forward. 242 Indeed, the whole point 
235 See, e.g., Klein, "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, supra note 200 passim. 
236 See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE LJ. 1297 
(1981). 
237 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (collecting authorities contending 
that most firms must take technology as given). 
238 See Klein, "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, supra note 200, at 356 (explaining 
that risk of opportunism arises because "complete, fully contingent, costlessly enforce-
able contracts are not possible"); id. at 356-57 (arguing that high information and 
monitoring costs make fully-contingent contracts impossible to negotiate and enforce 
in the real world). 
239 See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 198, at 713 (explaining how the 
institutional framework impacts the cost of conducting economic activity). 
240 See Williamson, "Why Law?, supra note 225, at 385 ("[There is a distinction] 
between institutional environment (or rules of the game) and the institutions of gov-
ernance (or play of the game)."); see also BARZEL, supra note 85, at 14 (explaining how 
contractual arrangements often determine actual scope and definition of property 
rights). 
241 See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 198, at 716-18 (explaining how 
legal institutions can affect transaction costs); see also CoASE, THE FIRM, supra note 
106, at 28 (arguing that a change in background rules can increase or decrease the 
cost of entering transactions). 
242 See, e.g., CoASE, THE FIRM, supra note 106, at 6-7 ("The existence of transaction 
costs will lead those who wish to trade to engage in practices which bring about a 
reduction of transaction costs whenever the loss suffered in other ways from the adop-
tion of those practices is less than the transaction cost saved. The people one deals 
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of TCE as applied to partial and complete integration is that certain 
forms of contractual integration will reduce the cost of transacting 
when compared to reliance upon an atomistic market. 243 Thus, just as 
firms will internalize the cost of relying upon the "spot" market, so too 
will they internalize the costs-be they higher or lower-of transact-
ing in a market governed by given contractual provisions. These costs, 
of course, will constitute a portion of the cost of producing and dis-
tributing the product in question. 
How is it, though, that a firm could induce trading partners-the 
very source of feared opportunism-to enter agreements that prevent 
future opportunism? Such agreements, after all, constrain such part-
ners, often at the very moment they desire more autonomy.244 Here 
one must consider a mundane aspect of the institutional framework: 
property law. Property law-including the law of intellectual prop-
erty-empowers manufacturers to exclude potential purchasers, 
including dealers, from their product unless the purchaser pays a 
price that satisfies the seller.245 This body of law will include the law 
of trademarks, which prevents firms from displaying the trademark of 
a manufacturer or a franchisor without the owner's consent.246 This 
clear assignment of rights will force potential opportunists to bargain 
with potential victims before opportunism can occur, in a setting of rel-
atively low exchange costs.247 As a result, manufacturers or 
with, the type of contract entered into, the kind of product or service supplied, will all be 
affected." (emphasis added)); Klein, "Unfair" Contractual Agreements, supra note 200 
passim (arguing that parties will adopt purportedly "unfair" contractual provisions as a 
means of minimizing transaction costs). 
243 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
244 See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140-41 
(1968) (contending that franchisees bound by exclusive dealing contracts would pre-
fer autonomy to purchase from supplier of their choice); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971) (adjudicating franchisees' claim that tying agree-
ment prevented them from purchasing inputs from low-cost suppliers). 
245 See Hale, supra note 174, at 610; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text 
(explaining how competitive market depends upon state-enforced background rules 
of property and contract). 
246 See]. THOMAS McCARTHY, 1 TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR CoMPETITION§ 2:14 (4th 
ed. 2008) ("Undoubtedly, a trademark confers a defined 'right to exclude'-a limited 
'exclusive right."'); see also Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 
(1916) ("Where a party has been in the habit of labeling his goods with a distinctive 
mark ... others are debarred from applying the same mark .... "). 
247 See Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 59, at 132-41 (describing such a pro-
cess of contract formation in the franchise context); see also Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (describing how one effect of setting initial entitle-
ments in the property and tort context is to reduce exchange costs). 
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franchisors will be able to recoup from purchasers the anticipated 
costs of opportunism that various contractual arrangements, includ-
ing reliance on the spot market, will produce. That is to say, buyers 
will pay the transaction costs that the seller must incur, including the 
costs of their own potential opportunism, just as they will pay the 
seller's costs of steel or electricity.248 
This may not be an equilibrium solution, however, as an outright· 
sale is not the only option available to the parties in question. 249 
Instead, a rational firm facing the prospect of opportunism may adopt 
various contracts or other practices that minimize the expected costs 
flowing from such opportunism, net of the costs of the practices them-
selves. 250 Other things being equal, theory would predict that the 
firm would choose that contractual arrangement minimizing the cost 
of future opportunism, thereby reducing the price it must charge 
trading partners.251 In the same way, of course, the firm will, ceteris 
paribus, choose the product configuration minimizing the chance of 
breakdown or risk of injury to the purchaser.252 
248 See Dahlman, supra note 234, at 144-45 (explaining how transaction costs are 
indistinguishable from other input costs); cf. Klein, "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 
supra note 200, at 357 (explaining that employers will reduce the wages of shirking 
employees to reflect cost of employee opportunism). 
249 See Langlois, supra note 101, at 11-12 (explaining that opportunism is not an 
equilibrium solution when parties can take steps to reduce such behavior); Klein, 
"Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, supra note 200, at 357 (explaining that opportunis-
tic exploitation of relationship-specific investments is "not a long-run equilibrium 
phenomenon"); id. ("In many cases, ... [simply] letting the party cheat and discount-
ing his wage will not be an economical solution because the gain to the cheater and 
therefore his acceptable compensating wage discount is less than the cost to the firm 
from his cheating behavior."). 
250 See CoASE, THE FIRM, supra note 106, at 6-7 (explaining that firms may reduce 
transaction costs by changing customers or suppliers and even the product offered); 
Klein, "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, supra note 200, at 358 ("Individuals would be 
willing to expend real resources to set up contractual arrangements to prevent such 
opportunism."); Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4]. L. EcoN. 
& 0RG. 65, 72 (1988) ("The main case to which transaction cost economics subscribes 
has been stated by Frank Knight as follows: 'Men in general, and within limits, wish to 
behave economically, to make their activities and their organization 'efficient' rather 
than wasteful. This fact does deserve the utmost emphasis .... '" (citation omitted) 
(quoting Frank H. Knight, Anthropolo15J and Economics, 53 J. PoL. EcoN. 247, 252 
(1941))). 
251 See R.H. Coase, Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J. L. EcoN. & ORe. 33, 39-40 
(1988) [hereinafter Coase, Influence] (arguing that competition forces firms to 
choose the level of vertical integration that minimizes costs); Coase, Nature of the Firm 
(EcoNOMICA), supra note 197, at 389 n.3 ("In a competitive system, there is an 'opti-
mum' amount of planning."). 
252 Priest, supra note 236, at 1313. 
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To be sure, some such arrangements will constrain a firm's deal-
ers or consumers, and such entities would, ceteris paribus, prefer com-
plete autonomy. Still, other things may not be equal, since constraint 
may be the very tool needed to minimize the risk of future opportu-
nism.253 H so, then the proponent of such an agreement will presum-
ably charge a lower price reflecting the reduced risk of opportunism 
than it would charge without such an agreement. 254 Thus, a dealer or 
consumer that desires a given product at the lowest possible price may 
have to accept restraints on its behavior in return, just as a purchaser 
that desires a low-priced warranty may have to accept restraints, such 
as a requirement not to use a consumer product for commercial pur-
poses. 255 A purchaser that insists on the freedom to victimize its trad-
ing partner will pay a stiff price for this right. 
Nothing about this account depends upon the seller's exercise of 
market power to obtain agreement to the restraint. To be sure, the 
seller may hope that, say, promotion induced by a restraint differenti-
ates its product and thereby confers modest market power.256 Still, 
acquisition of such power is not necessary for success of this strategy; 
the strategy may be (minimally) successful if the firm simply retains 
enough customers to earn a normal return. 257 Thus, such a tactic is 
no more an "exercise" or "use" of market power than the adoption of 
a new technological process that reduces production costs. 258 
The analysis thus far rests upon an unrealistic assumption, 
namely, that "other things" really are equal when firms are choosing 
between atomistic markets and integration. There is, however, a par-
ticular manner in which things are not entirely equal, viz., the utility 
of the party to be bound by the restraint. To be sure, this party will 
253 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANn-
TRUST L. J. 135 (1984) (reduction in competition is the tool that vertical restraints 
employ to reduce opportunism). 
254 See WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 32-33 (explaining 
that firms will charge lower prices when there is a safeguard in place preventing or 
reducing the risk of opportunism); see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical 
Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REv. 143, 186-88 (1997) [hereinafter 
Meese, Vertical Restraints] (explaining how firm adopting restraint minimizing oppor-
tunism will charge lower price for the product that the restraint accompanies). 
255 See Priest, supra note 236, at 1313 (contending that consumers will demand 
cost-justified coverage exclusions in warranty contracts). 
256 See Telser, supra note 205, at 87 (arguing that product differentiation pro-
duced by vertical restraints leads to market power). 
257 See Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 74, at 165-67. 
258 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(distinguishing between exercise of market power and realization of efficiencies 
derived from larger scale or integration of related functions). 
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value lower prices. The party will also value future autonomy allowing 
it to behave opportunistically, however.259 So, for instance, a dealer 
will value its ability not to expend resources on promoting the manu-
facturer's product, hoping to free ride on promotional efforts of 
others. 260 Thus, a dealer would be willing to pay "something extra" to 
avoid restraints that combat opportunism. The process that results in 
the "imposition" of non-standard contracts reducing transaction costs 
must therefore involve more than simply single-firm cost-minimizing 
behavior. Instead, this process must somehow account for the prefer-
ence that a firm's trading partners have for post-sale autonomy. 
This sort of post-sale autonomy is, simply put, not free. As already 
explained, sellers will charge a price that reflects the costs they must 
bear under a given transactional relationship, including a premium 
that reflects the cost of anticipated opportunism resulting from an 
unconstrained sale and resulting buyer autonomy. Thus, potential 
opportunists will be forced to consider proposed contracts "in their 
entirety," that is, the complete package of contractual terms and 
accompanying price.261 A contract allowing buyers post-sale auton-
omy will create a potential for mischief, a potential incorporated in 
the price of products sold without opportunism-reducing restric-
tions.262 This premium will cause the purchaser fully to internalize 
potential harms from its hoped-for autonomy and possibly lead it to 
prefer a sale with an accompanying constraint and reduced price.263 
Recognizing the interaction between price and contractual terms 
and the derivative importance of examining contracting in its entirety, 
we can reconceptualize the process of forming non-standard contracts 
that reduce the (prospective) cost of transacting. Assume for the sake 
of clarity that a manufacturer sells its product to dealers, and that 
unconstrained dealers might behave opportunistically by, for instance, 
259 Cf Coase, Nature of the Firm (EcoNoMrCA), supra note 197, at 390 (explaining 
how, in isolated cases, individuals may desire autonomy for its own sake, thereby 
explaining reliance on the market). 
260 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
261 See WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 35 (explaining 
importance of considering "contracting in its entirety"). 
262 !d. at 35 ("Inasmuch as price and governance are linked, parties to a contract 
should not expect to have their cake (low price) and eat it too (no safeguard). More 
generally, it is important to study contracting in its entirety. Both the ex ante terms and 
the manner in which contracts are thereafter executed vary with the investment char-
acteristics and the associated governance structures within which transactions are 
embedded."). 
263 Cf Klein, "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, supra note 200, at 357-58 (explain-
ing how shirking employees or managers will receive lower wages thereby forcing 
them to compare the social cost of shirking to the benefits they derive therefrom). 
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steering consumers to purchase rivals' products.264 Imagine that each 
seller offers each dealer two options. Under option one, the seller 
offers to sell the relevant product "free and clear," without contractual 
restraint, satisfying the purchaser's preference for post-sale autonomy 
and resulting risk of opportunism. Under option two, the seller offers 
to sell the relevant product, accompanied by a restraint, such as an 
exclusive dealing contract.265 Such exclusivity would modify the 
dealer's right to stock whichever goods it wished, thereby perfecting 
the manufacturer's own property right in the fruits of its promotional 
expenditures. 266 
Each option will entail the same technological production costs 
for the seller. At the same time, option one will entail higher transac-
tion costs, of a non-technological origin. Absent price regulation, the 
final price of each option will reflect that cost difference.267 Thus, the 
buyer will face a choice: the product plus autonomy at a high price, or 
the product plus restraint at a low price. So long as the cost of pro-
spective opportunism and resulting price differential is greater than 
any autonomy benefits to the buyer, the buyer will choose the second 
option and resulting constraint. That is, the threat of opportunism 
will manifest itself in a price differential that induces the buyer to 
internalize the costs of its prospective opportunism and choose the 
option maximizing the joint welfare of the parties over time.268 With 
ex ante bargaining costs low and a legal regime recognizing property 
and its right to exclude, prices will do more than simply reflect the 
cost of inputs-such as labor and material-recognized by price the-
ory. Instead, this price-a single variable-will also impound the cost 
264 See Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, supra note 209, at 7-8. 
265 !d. at 6-8 (explaining how an exclusive dealing contract can prevent this form 
of opportunism). 
266 !d. 
267 See WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 33-35 (explaining 
how sale price and governance terms are ~fully interactive" and that seller's price will 
reflect the presence (or not) of contractual safeguards that prevent opportunism); 
Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 254, at 186-88. In (then-unpublished) 1932 cor-
respondence, Professor Coase modeled such higher costs as an increased cost of capi-
tal related to a manufacturer's relationship-specific investment that gave rise to a risk 
of opportunism. See R.H. Coase, Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4]. L. EcoN. & ORe. 3, 13 
(1988) [hereinafter Coase, Origin]. 
268 See WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 33 (explaining 
how firms will charge prices reflecting presence or not of contractual terms that pre-
vent opportunism, and how such differentials can induce trading partners to agree to 
provisions that limit prospective opportunism); see also Meese, Tying, supra note 41, at 
69-70 (explaining how cost-based price differentials can induce acceptance of tying 
contracts that reduce prospect of opportunism). 
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of possible opportunistic behavior by the buyer, stretching as far into 
the future as the parties might imagine.269 Thus, the price system can 
operate to induce the negotiation of a contract redefining the prop-
erty rights of the parties, voluntarily eliminating market failure,just as 
Coase predicted. 270 
This process might seem like a quintessential exercise of market 
power to "impose" a contract against the will of the buyer who, after 
all, "prefers" complete autonomy. As explained earlier, such an exer-
cise can, as Chicagoans explained, be modeled as the threatened exac-
tion of a monopoly price as a means of inducing buyers to agree to 
non-standard clauses.271 Moreover, buyers that agree to non-standard 
provisions will pay a lower price for the seller's product than they 
would without the restriction. 272 Indeed, the manufacturer likely pos-
sesses market power due to product differentiation, power the seller 
must, it seems, be exercising to "impose" the agreement. 
Still, there is a critical difference between the use of power to 
impose a contract as imagined by Chicago School scholars, and the 
sort of "Coasean bargain" I have just described. That is, unlike the 
differentials associated with the "use" of market power, in which the 
higher price (by definition) exceeds cost, the differential inducing the 
Coasean bargain reflects the different costs of the different options 
offered. In particular, the higher price, which accompanies the sale 
without a contractual safeguard, simply reflects the prospective cost of 
opportunism that the seller expects to incur at the hands of an uncon-
strained buyer. While not a historical, technological cost, like the cost 
of steel or labor, it is a cost nonetheless.273 Increasing one's price to 
reflect this additional cost does not constitute an exercise of market 
power.274 An automobile manufacturer that charges extra for leather 
269 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowl£dge in Society, 35 AM. EcoN. REv. 519, 526 
( 1945) (explaining how a single price can incorporate all of the information available 
to a particular party bearing on the cost of a transaction). There is, of course, an 
implicit assumption that the potential victim of opportunism will remain in the mar-
ketplace long enough to suffer such harm at the hands of its trading partner. A firm 
with a shorter time horizon, by contrast, will not fear such opportunism. 
270 SeeR.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3]. L. & EcoN. 1,15 (1960) (referring 
to process of "rearrangement of legal rights through the market" by bargaining in an 
environment of low transaction costs). 
271 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
273 See, e.g., Coase, Origin, supra note 267, at 12, 15-16 (reproducing correspon-
dence treating risk of opportunism as a source of higher capital costs). 
274 I have previously made this point with respect to tying contracts. See Meese, 
Tying, supra note 41, at 66-70. 
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seats is not exercising market power, even if the premium "forces" the 
buyer to choose cloth or purchase from a different seller altogether. 
To be sure, the right to exclude others from one's property is 
"coercive," because it depends upon state force. 275 Still, creation and 
enforcement of property and contract is also necessary to perfect com-
petition.276 Such production and exchange results in prices equal to 
cost, with no firm exercising market power. Property does not ipso 
facto confer market power according to price theory and antitrust. 
Price theorists may nonetheless object to this conclusion. In per-
fect competition, each firm is a price taker.277 A firm that attempts to 
pass idiosyncratic costs along to consumers will see its sales drop to 
zero.278 It thus seems that the ability to charge a price higher than 
other firms in the same market necessarily reflects the possession and 
exercise of market power. Was Coase simply wrong when he claimed 
that his "transaction cost" rationale for vertical integration was inde-
pendent of monopoly?279 
Close reflection confirms Coase's conclusion. Opportunism is 
not an isolated phenomenon, suffered by. a single seller in a relevant 
market. If, say, one dealer poses a threat of opportunism to a particu-
lar seller, other dealers likely pose the same threat to similarly situated 
sellers as well. Thus, dealing with such unconstrained customers will 
impose the same costs on all firms in the marketplace. Moreover, the 
prospect of such opportunism would presumably induce all market 
participants to adopt mechanisms to avoid it, including, of course, 
non-standard agreements. If the costs of such opportunism exceeded 
the benefits of dealer autonomy, then one would expect a market 
equilibrium in which all firms minimized transaction costs by offering 
such price differentials and thereby securing agreement to such non-
standard contracts.280 Such a process of market-wide contract forma-
275 See, e.g., Hale, supra note 174, at 604. 
276 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
277 See STIGLER, CoMPETITIVE PRICE, supra note 85, at 21-22, 149. 
278 Id. at 156 ("[In perfect competition,] no firm can sell any amount above the 
ruling price .... "); id. at 149 (explaining how historical cost does not determine the 
price a firm can charge in a competitive market). 
279 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
280 See Klein, "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, supra note 200, at 362 ("When all 
firms in a particular industry use similar contractual provisions .... [s]uch uniformity 
suggests the existence of independent attempts within a competitive environment to 
solve an important common problem .... "); Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 74, at 
166 (explaining that market participants may simultaneously rely upon partial inte-
gration to differentiate their products). In other contexts, courts have recognized 
that apparently parallel conduct may reflect independent decision making by firms 
responding to similar market stimuli. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
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tion would be indistinguishable from the process through which all 
firms in the market end up offering the same or similar warranties.281 
Parties bound by such agreements may have no economically mean-
ingful choice but to sign them and adhere to their provisions. In the 
same way, however, purchasers of a home appliance may have "no 
choice" but to accept a warranty that excludes recovery for damages 
incurred because the product was used for commercial purposes.282 
Moreover, unlike the world of perfect competition, this process 
will not take place in an instant; different firms might adopt different 
solutions on the unsteady path to equilibrium. 283 Some firms may 
adopt idiosyncratic solutions, responsive to their own peculiar circum-
stances, groping for best practices through a process of trial and 
error.284 Over time firms will settle upon a particular solution, such as 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (holding that parallel conduct equally consistent with 
normal competition cannot support inference of conspiracy); Theatre Enters., Inc. v. 
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-42 (1954) (same); Williamson Oil 
Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1303 (11th Cir. 2003) (same). Indeed, 
alleged ties are per se legal when all firms in the marketplace require purchasers to 
take the putative tied product to obtain the seller's version of the tying product. See 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 20-23 (1984). Such universal 
bundling establishes that selling such items separately will increase production costs. 
Id. at 21. 
281 To be sure, some sellers may expend resources attempting to distinguish 
opportunistic customers from those who are trustworthy. See WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 48 (" [I)f the propensity to behave opportunistically is 
known to vary among members of the contracting population, ... gains can be real-
ized by expending resources to discriminate among types."). Moreover, firms may 
adopt strategies reducing the risk of opportunism. See Klein & Saft, supra note 206, at 
348 n.15 (explaining how one franchisor granted franchise opportunities far from 
superhighways and prohibited in-store dining, thereby maximizing the number of 
repeat customers and reducing franchisees' incentive to shirk). Still, the mere fact 
that some firms combat opportunism in this manner does not establish that firms that 
do adopt non-standard agreements have employed market power to impose them. 
282 See Priest, supra note 236, at 1313 (explaining that consumers will demand 
contractual exclusions from warranty coverage when the resulting cost borne by the 
consumer will be less than the cost to the manufacturer of bearing the loss excluded 
from coverage) . 
283 See Hayek, supra note 85, at 101-02 ("[I]n conditions of real life the position 
even of any two producers is hardly ever the same . . . . At any given moment the 
equipment of a particular firm is always largely determined by historical accident, and 
the problem is that it should make the best use of the given equipment (including the 
acquired capacities of the members of its staff) and not what it should do if it were 
given unlimited time to adjust to constant conditions."); see also KNIGHT, RisK, UNCER-
TAINlY, ANo PROFIT, supra note 84, at 78 (noting that, in perfect competition, produc-
tion and exchange are instantaneous). 
284 See Alan ]. Meese, Monopoly Bundling in Cyberspace: How Many Products Does 
Microsoft Sell? 44 ANTITRUST BuLL. 65, 87-89 (1999) (explaining how different firms 
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complete or partial integration. Firms that fail to locate the optimal 
solution will find themselves at a disadvantage compared to those that 
do.285 Invariably, antitrust litigation will capture only a snapshot of 
this evolutionary process, which may or may not appear to involve the 
"use" or "exercise" of market power. 
It therefore seems plain that firms may obtain voluntary agree-
ment to certain non-standard contracts, including those that 
"exclude" rivals, without "using" or "exercising" market power. Of 
course, some firms that obtain such agreements do, in fact, possess 
preexisting market power. Still, the mere fact that a firm possesses 
even monopoly power does not mean that the firm employs that 
power whenever it negotiates a contractual term with a trading part-
ner. For instance, an automobile manufacturer that possesses monop-
oly power may offer a particular engine in each car, an engine that 
consumers feel compelled to accept. Absent price regulation, there is 
no reason to believe that the resulting sale reflects the seller's "use" or· 
"exercise" of power.286 To be sure, the firm will exercise its monopoly 
power, by reducing the output of automobiles and thereby increasing 
prices. There is, however, no reason for the firm to "employ" such 
power to reduce the quality of engines that it offers. Indeed, the very 
concept makes little sense. If consumers value a particular engine and 
are willing to pay for it, then a (greedy) monopolist will maximize 
profits by offering that engine and charging what the market will 
bear.287 
might face trading partners with different propensities toward opportunism and 
therefore adopt different mechanisms to deal with this phenomenon). 
285 See Coase, Influence, supra note 251, at 39-40 (arguing that competition forces 
firms to choose the level of vertical integration that minimizes costs); Coase, Nature of 
the Firm (EcoNOMICA), supra note 197 at 389 n.3 (stating that, in a private market, 
there is an optimal amount of planning); see also JosEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SociALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84-85 (1943) (arguing that price competition is "a matter 
of comparative indifference" when compared to "the competition from the new com-
modity, the new technology, the new source of supply, [or] the new type of organization." 
(emphasis added)); Annen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 
J. PoL. EcoN. 211, 214-21 (1950). 
286 See generally Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAw 
& EcoNOMICS 81, 83-84 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) (arguing that competitive markets 
will produce efficient (i.e., costjustified) contractual terms on the assumption that 
sellers are able to alter their prices to recover the cost of various contractual terms). 
287 See David Besanko, Shabtai Donnenfeld, & Lawrence J. White, Monopoly and 
Quality Distortion: Affects and Remedies, 102 Q. J. EcoN. 743 (1987); Richard Schmalen-
see, Market Structure, Durability, and Quality: A Selective Survey, 17 EcoN. INQUIRY 177 
(1979); A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL]. EcoN. 417 
(1975). This is not to say that market structure will have no impact on product attrib-
utes. Because a monopolist will reduce its output below the "competitive" level, the 
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Similar logic applies to contractual terms. Take warranties. 
In a well-functioning competitive market with sellers free to ad-
just prices, firms will offer only those warranty terms that are "cost-
justified" from the perspective of consumers.288 The same result 
will obtain if the seller has a monopoly.289 In the case of mon-
opoly a desire to maximize profits will induce the seller to 
offer whatever warranty terms consumers are willing to pay for. 290 
Similar logic applies to all contractual terms. 291 Inferior terms 
"marginal" consumers to whom it sells may have different preferences from those of 
the marginal consumers in a competitive market. If the firm makes its quality deci-
sion based upon efforts to attract and retain marginal consumers, the existence of a 
monopoly may thereby alter the nature of the engine and other accessories that the 
firm chooses to offer. See Spence, supra, at 417-21; see also Alan Schwartz & Louis L. 
Wilde, Interoening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979) (explaining how firms may respond to prefer-
ences of marginal consumers). Even if a monopoly alters product quality for this 
reason, there is no reason to assume that this change reduces social welfare as com-
pared to the quality produced by a competitive market. Moreover, even if a monopo-
listic reduction in output does reduce welfare for this reason, it does not appear that 
this quality reduction is "imposed" on purchasers via the exercise of market power. 
Instead, the reduction reflects efforts by the monopolist to satisfY the preferences of 
some consumers in the marketplace. While this effort may reduce the welfare of 
other, infra-marginal consumers, such a result is not uniquely the result of market 
power. Instead, infra-marginal consumers can suffer identical harm in a competitive 
market, where firms might also cater to the preferences of some consumers, to the 
detriment of others. See generally Bork, A Reply to Professors, supra note 166, at 742-43. 
288 See Craswell, supra note 286, at 83-84; Priest, supra note 236, at 1313 (contend-
ing that cost-justified warranty disclaimers and exclusions "can be said to be 
demanded by consumers because of the relative cheapness of consumer allocative 
investments or of self-insurance"). 
289 See Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. 
REv. 1053, 1071-76 (1977) (possession of market power will not alter content of man-
ufacturer warranties). 
290 Indeed, Professor Craswell suggests that monopolists might be more likely to 
offer efficient contractual terms, because such firms will not face marketplace rivals 
who "free ride" on their discovery and use of new contractual terms. See Craswell, 
supra note 286, at 86-87. 
291 Professor Craswell has summarized this logic as follows: 
[M]onopolists usually will not have an incentive to choose inefficient con-
tract terms. The monopolist may have an incentive to charge a high price, 
of course, but this does not mean that she'll also have an incentive to distort 
any of the other contract clauses. If consumers know what the monopolist is 
doing-an important qualification ... -then any attempt by the monopo-
list to insert an inefficient term will be seen by consumers as an increase in 
the 'total price' of the product .... But if the monopolist wants to exploit 
buyers, she can usually do better by raising the monetary price of the prod-
uct, rather than by raising the 'total price' by using an inefficient contract 
term. The problem with raising the total price indirectly, by using an ineffi-
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will only anse if firms face price ceilings or imperfect informa-
tion.292 
Of course, not all non-standard contracts involve express price 
differentials of the sort hypothesized by these models, though many 
do.293 Take, for example, Brown Shoe Co., where the Commission chal-
lenged Brown's contractual requirement that shoe stores purchase 
most of their shoe requirements from Brown.294 Brown offered stores 
two options. First, stores could purchase Brown's shoes "free and 
clear," i.e., with no accompanying contractual restraint. Second, a 
firm could participate in Brown's franchise program and thus receive 
various benefits including discounts on certain shoes, insurance, 
below-cost outdoor neon signs, and similar assistance.295 However, 
participation also obligated these dealers to concentrate their efforts 
on marketing Brown's products and to refuse to sell "conflicting lines" 
cient contract tenn, is that-by definition-an inefficient contract tenn 
hurts buyers by more than it helps the monopolist. By contrast, a higher 
monetary price helps the monopolist by exactly the same amount that it 
hurts the buyers: the amount of the higher price. This is why the monopo-
list will usually be better off exploiting buyers by charging a higher monetary 
price, rather than by inserting an inefficient contractual tenn. 
Craswell, supra note 286, at 85; see also Schwartz, supra note 289, at 1072 ("If a monop-
olist's customers prefer to have warranties rather than disclaimers, and if these cus-
tomers will pay the premium for additional warranty protection, the monopolist 
would be irrational not to offer a warranty. Offering only a disclaimer would cost him 
potential profits."). 
292 See supra notes 106, 286-87. 
293 See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134 (1936) (reporting that 
one customer obtained right to manufacture its own version of the tied product by 
paying a fifteen percent premium for the tying product); FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 
261 U.S. 463 (1923 (evaluating an arrangement whereby a refiner provided pumps at 
a discount on the condition that retail stations employ them exclusively with refiner's 
gasoline); Acquaire v. Can. Dry Bottling Co. of N.Y., 24 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (evalu-
ating an agreement setting maximum prices for dealers that received promotional 
discounts from the manufacturer); Shamrock Mktg., Inc. v. Bridgestone Bandag, 
LLC, 777 F. Supp. 2d 972, 977, 980-81 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (describing and evaluating 
franchise program that provided discounts to franchisees that purchased materials 
supplied by the franchisor); United States v. Am. Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. 
Cal. 1949) (describing requirements contracts and related discount program that 
"serves as an inducement for canners to purchase all of their needs from a single 
manufacturer"); see also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52, 54-55 (1962) 
(approving decree permitting film distributors to set prices reflecting cost reductions 
attributed to tying inferior films to popular films). 
294 62 F.T.C. 679 (1963). 
295 !d. at 687-89 (citing initial decision describing the benefits received); id. at 
710 n.17 (incorporating this finding by reference); id. at 703 (describing reciprocal 
obligation to concentrate business in Brown's various shoe lines). 
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of shoes. 296 The Commission expressly found that these discounts 
induced participating franchisees to agree to restrictions on their 
purchasing freedom, restrictions that "foreclose[d]" rivals from selling 
to Brown's dealers.297 If such "line concentration" was justified, the 
Commission said, dealers would so-concentrate voluntarily, that is, 
without contractual requirement.298 
Still, there are cases in which defendants "imposed" such agree-
ments simply by refusing to deal with trading partners who decline to 
enter the exclusionary provision. 299 However, the absence of express 
price differentials in particular cases does not undermine the Coasean 
bargain model of contract formation. For one thing, an "outright 
refusal" may operate as a de facto price differential, if the purchaser 
can only obtain a. substitute for the seller's product elsewhere for a 
higher price.300 Buyers would then face the following choice: 
purchase the high-priced substitute, or purchase the defendant's 
product at a discount, accompanied by the exclusionary agreement. 
Moreover, a refusal to sell can be seen as the equivalent of offering to 
sell the underlying product without the offending provision, but at an 
infinite price.301 Thus, the "price differential" model of contract for-
mation describes a larger class of conduct than initially supposed. 
Finally, exclusive focus on refusals to sell during a finite period 
ignores the temporal and evolutionary aspect of economic activity. 
The facts of a particular case are basically a "snapshot" of an economic 
process that continues to unfold over time in light of ever-changing 
conditions and stimuli. Struggling firms may employ non-standard 
contracts for good reasons in one period, only to "forget" a decade 
later why they adopted the practice.302 Other firms may simply copy 
296 Id. at 703. 
297 Id. at 709-17. 
298 ld. at 709. 
299 See, e.g., At!. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (analyzing exclusive dealing contracts apparently imposed 
in this manner). 
300 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394·U.S. 495, 503 (1969) (explain-
ing that even a complete monopolist will lose some sales by raising his price). 
301 See Meese, Tying, supra note 41, at 13. 
302 See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 52, at 5 ("Firms try dozens of 
practices. Most of them are flops, and the firms must try something else or disappear 
.... In a competitive struggle the firms that use the best practices survive. Mistakes 
are buried. Why do particular practices work? The firms that selected the practices 
may or may not know what is special about them. They can describe what they do, but 
the why is far more difficult." (internal citation omitted)); Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the 
Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST LJ. 461, 
485 (2000) ("Firms are simply collections of individuals, who adopt practices and then 
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successful rivals' practices. Antitrust litigation often arrives long after 
the parties have adopted a challenged contract, leaving tribunals and 
scholars to examine only the result of a bargaining process that took 
place years ago. In these circumstances, courts may have to guess just 
how defendants induced acceptance of such agreements in the first 
place.303 Since antitrust law has not made anything tum on the exis-
tence of such differentials, but simply asserted that all such agree-
ments are the result of coercion, it should be no surprise that 
differentials do not always reveal themselves in the records of particu-
lar cases. 304 Thus, the absence of an observed express differential in a 
given case could simply reflect an outcome of a continuous bargaining 
process that once included them. 305 
move on-or retire. Efficient practices-and the firms that adopt them-will survive, 
even if firms cannot "remember" why they were adopted."). 
303 See United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(reviewing policy in place for "more than fifteen years"); see also Alchian, supra note 
285, passim; Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 52, at 5; Stigler, Economies of 
Scale, supra note 136, at 54-57 (discussing so-called "survivor principle"). 
304 Cf Oliver E. Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 105, 113 (1969) ("[O]nce an economies defense is admitted in principle, 
incentives are set in motion to sharpen up the specification of economies of various 
sorts."). It may also be the case that, after contemplating the prospect of offering two 
separate agreements, the proponent of an exclusionary agreement determines that its 
partners will always or almost always opt for one of them. If so, offering each option 
to all purchasers may not be costjustified. 
305 Importantly, background rules governing form contracting may reduce the 
likelihood that proponents of such agreements will expressly offer trading partners 
more than one contractual option. Once some parties agree to exclusive provisions, a 
seller that allows others to elect different provisions will not be able to represent that 
contracts containing exclusionary provisions are "standard" and thus will not be able 
to rely upon any presumption that its partners assented to these provisions. See 
REsTATEMENT oF CoNTRAcrs (SEcOND) § 211. Without this presumption, the propo-
nent seeking enforcement of the agreement will have to prove that the party to be 
bound was in fact aware of the provision and thereby subjectively assented to it. Id. 
Thus, allowing trading partners to choose between various contractual options may 
impose significant costs of bargaining and negotiation on proponents of such agree-
ments. While such background rules are the product of state law and thus exogenous 
to antitrust law, they may well influence the manner in which negotiations play out, if 
not the content of bargains themselves. See CoASE, THE FIRM, supra note 106, at 28 
(noting that the law can "make transactions more or less costly by altering the require-
ments for making a legally binding contract"); Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 
198 at 717-18 (stating that background rules construct an institutional framework 
that impacts the allocation of resources). 
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C. The Voluntary Formation of Anticompetitive Contracts 
TCE does not suggest that all non-standard agreements are bene-
ficial and thus the result of the sort of "Coasean bargain" just 
described.306 Nor does TCE purport to exclude the possibility that 
some such contracts are harmful and thus perhaps the result of the 
"exercise" of market power.307 Thus, at the most, the analysis to this 
point would seem only to undermine a conclusive presumption that 
such agreements are the harmful result of market power. The analysis 
would not seem to establish a contrary presumption, namely, that 
such agreements are always or even usually the result of voluntary 
integration. 
Still, realization that some exclusionary agreements produced 
benefits opened the door to a larger reconsideration of the impact of 
such contracts. Indeed, just as TCE was achieving its status as an alter-
native paradigm, scholars were reconsidering the harmful potential of 
non-standard agreements. These scholars noted that many supposed 
instances of "abuse" of market power to obtain more arose in markets 
whose structure precluded this strategy.308 They also conceded the 
306 But cf. WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 28 (articulating 
a rebuttable presumption that non-standard agreements are beneficial methods of 
reducing transaction costs); WILLIAMSON, MARKETs, supra note 197, at 20 (arguing for 
such a presumption); Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 74, at 99-101 (explaining how 
current structure of Rule of Reason analysis rests upon the assumption that restraints 
that avoid per se treatment are in fact beneficial, subject only to contrary proof by a 
plaintiff). 
307 See supra notes 214-221 and accompanying text (explaining how proponents 
of TCE have articulated a rebuttable presumption that non-standard agreements have 
efficiency purposes). 
308 Two cases involving the Brown Shoe Company exemplified this insight. In the 
first, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the Department of Justice 
successfully challenged Brown's acquisition of Kinney corporation and its retail out-
lets, because the transaction supposedly "foreclosed" Brown's rivals from access to 
Kinney's outlets. In fact, the merger foreclosed less than five percent of the retail 
market. Id. at 327. Second, in Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 62 F.T.C. 679 (1963), the Com-
mission challenged a non-exclusive dealing arrangement between Brown Shoe and 
one percent of the nation's shoe dealers, because the arrangement "foreclosed" other 
manufacturers from selling their products to such dealers. The Supreme Court 
agreed with the Commission, finding that the arrangement offended the "central pol-
icy" of the Sherman Act and violated § 5 of the FTC Act. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 
U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966). Scholars subsequently pointed out that the absence of mar-
ket concentration undermined any claim that the merger or arrangements with deal-
ers were efforts to obtain or maintain market power. For these scholars, the absence 
of plausible anticompetitive harm prompted an inference that the restraints pro-
duced competitive benefits. See BoRK, ANTITRUST PARADox, supra note 151, at 205 
(contending that a trend toward concentration in an unconcentrated market "indi-
cates that there are emerging efficiencies or economics of scale"); id. at 302-303 
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insights of TCE, namely, that some such restraints produced bene-
fits.309 At the same time, these scholars rejected Chicago's broad-
brushed attack on the "abuse of power" test.310 
If some such agreements produced benefits, and many produced 
no harm, antitrust law would need a more discerning method for dis-
tinguishing harmful agreements from those that produced benefits. 311 
The result was the so-called "raising rivals costs" (RRC) paradigm. 
RRC did not question TCE's conclusion that non-standard agree-
ments could rearrange property rights and contractual obligations 
and thus maximize the joint welfare of the parties to them.312 Instead, 
RCC purported to explain how these rearrangements could some-
times interfere with rivals' access to inputs, raise the costs of those 
third parties, and thereby confer market power on the proponent of 
such an agreement.313 Take exclusive dealing contracts. While deal-
ers ordinarily have the right to sell the goods of as many manufactur-
ers as they please, such agreements obligate the dealer to distribute 
the goods of a single manufacturer, to the exclusion of others. By 
depriving rival manufacturers of access to low-cost distribution of their 
products, it was said, the proponent of such agreements could force 
rivals to employ more costly distribution techniques, including less 
efficient dealers, thereby raising rivals' costs and prices and allowing 
the proponent to exercise market power by pricing above its own 
lower costs. 314 
The RRC paradigm did not conclude that all "exclusionary agree-
ments" are plausible cost-raising strategies. Instead, a successful RRC 
strategy required the coincidence of several restrictive necessary con-
ditions, a coincidence that proponents of RRC admitted was relatively 
(explaining how exclusive dealing contracts could not produce anticompetitive harm 
given trivial portion of market's dealers bound by such restraints); PosNER, supra note 
52, at 204 (concluding that exclusive leasing provision could not be anticompetitive 
and thus likely produced efficiencies). 
309 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Rais-
ing Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 228-29, 277-80 (1986) 
[hereinafter Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion]. 
310 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
311 See Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 717, 741-42 (1960) (declaring 
exclusive arrangements between manufacturer and door-to-door salesmen a violation 
of § 3 of the Clayton Act). 
312 See supra note 194 and accompanying text (explaining this conclusion ofTCE). 
313 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive E-xclusion, supra note 309; Steven C. 
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. 267 (1983). 
314 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 309, at 223-27; 
id. at 226 (explaining how retail distribution can best be viewed as an input in the 
overall process of manufacture and distribution). 
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rare.315 Indeed, proponents ofRRC took issue with several inhospital-
ity era decisions condemning exclusionary agreements, conceding 
that many such agreements could reduce transaction costs without 
creating harm.316 
In any event, RRC did not undermine the Coasean account of 
contract formation sketched above or otherwise suggest that harmful 
contracts are imposed via market power. In fact, RRC theory was self-
consciously addressed to situations in which proponents of agree-
ments did not possess preexisting market power, but instead employed 
such agreements to obtain power.317 In this way, these scholars 
avoided the Chicago critique, described earlier, that a firm with 
monopoly power could not use that power to obtain additional 
monopoly profits.s1s 
However, RRC theorists have not explained how parties obtain 
agreement to harmful exclusionary rights contracts. The chief propo-
nents of the RRC paradigm, Professors Krattenmaker and Salop, have 
divided market power into two varieties: "Bainian power," viz., power 
that a restraint creates by raising the cost that some market participants 
pay for inputs, and "Stiglerian" power, i.e., the preexisting power a 
firm might possess independent of any restraints, perhaps because 
economies of scale result in concentration and barriers to entry.319 
Exclusionary rights contracts, they say, create the former, Bainian 
power. At the same time, Professors Krattenmaker and Salop have 
repeatedly emphasized that firms need not possess preexisting Stigler-
ian power to obtain such agreements, without explaining how a firm 
without power can induce acceptance of them.32° 
315 ld. at 223-30 (describing various conditions necessary for a successful raising 
rivals' costs strategy); id. at 267 ("Certainly, in most industries, exclusionary rights 
contracts cannot be profitably employed for anticompetitive ends."); cf. B. F. Good-
rich Co., 110 F.T.C. 207 (1988) (rejecting proposed enforcement action against verti-
cal merger because conditions outlined by raising rivals' costs paradigm were not 
met). 
316 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 309, at 228-29. 
317 ld. at 248-49; id. at 251 ("[A] firm need not enjoy or acquire traditional mar-
ket power to gain the ability to price above pre-exclusionary-rights competitive 
levels."); Thomas G. Krattenmaker eta!., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust 
Law, 76 GEO. LJ. 241 (1987) (distinguishing between preexisting "Stiglerian" power 
and "Bainian" power created by restraints that raise rivals' costs). 
318 See supra Part II.D. 
319 See Krattenmaker, supra note 317, at 249; see also GEORGE]. STIGLER, THE THE-
ORY OF PRICE, 195-99 (3d ed. 1966). 
320 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTITRUST LJ. 
71, 79 (1987); Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Anal-
ysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MAsoN. L. REv. 617, 626-28 (1999) (endors-
ing result in Eastman Kodak). 
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Moreover, nothing about the possession of Stiglerian power pre-
vents firms from employing exclusionary rights agreements to obtain 
Bainian power. For instance, technological conditions that once 
raised entry barriers and conferred Stiglerian power could change, 
leaving a firm facing the prospect of stiffer competifion.321 A firm 
might then obtain an exclusionary rights contract from various cus-
tomers and/or input suppliers, preserving its market power.322 Cer-
tainly these agreements involve the "use" of (preexisting, Stiglerian) 
market power to impose them.323 
Actually, they do not. Instead, parties can form such agreements 
in exactly the same way that firms form agreements that reduce trans-
action costs, i.e., by employing cost-based price differentials to induce 
their acceptance. To understand how, assume for a moment that a 
firm without market power hopes to achieve it by employing exclusive 
dealing contracts to raise rivals' costs and thereby obtain market 
power. 324 The firm could proceed in the following manner. First, it 
could offer to sell the product to dealers with no accompanying con-
tractual restraint, charging the ordinary, profit-maximizing price. The 
firm could also offer to sell the product to dealers at a discount, if the 
dealer enters an exclusive dealing arrangement. 
This differential could induce dealers to accept the exclusive 
dealing arrangement, even if they might otherwise prefer to retain 
their autonomy. To be sure, this differential "looks like" the differen-
tial that price theorists attributed to an exercise of market power.325 
Still, by hypothesis, the firm in question has no such power, but 
instead merely possesses the "power" possessed by all firms, that is, the 
321 For instance, technology could change, reducing the minimum viable scale 
required for profitable production. Or, market demand could expand sufficiently, 
increasing sales available to a new entrant, thereby rendering such entry profitable. 
See DEPARTMENT OF JusTICE & FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION, HoRIZONTAL MERGER 
GuiDELINES§ 3.3 (1992) (detailing link between concept of minimum viable scale and 
prospect of new entry); STIGLER, THE THEORY oF PRICE, supra note 319, at 220-23. 
322 See Richard A. Posner, Keynote Address: Vertical Restrictions and ''Fragile" Monopoly, 
50 ANTITRUST BuLL. 499, 501-02 (2005) (explaining via example how a monopolist 
might be willing to offer discounts to secure exclusive dealing arrangements if its 
monopoly became fragile). 
323 See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. U.S. 451 (1992) 
(finding that monopolist had violated § 2 by "using" monopoly power via tying 
contracts). 
324 See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 309, at 223-27. 
325 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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"power" to exclude others from its property, and thus the "power" to 
make contracts that bind trading partners in future periods.326 
The price differential just described, then, simply reflects the rel-
ative costs (to the manufacturer) of the two arrangements. By declin-
ing to include the exclusive dealing arrangement in the first class of 
contract, the firm incurs an opportunity cost, namely, the additional 
(supracompetitive) profits that it could have earned had it entered 
contracts raising its rivals' costs.327 From the firm's perspective, this 
cost is indistinguishable from any other cost, be it a production cost or 
the cost of opportunism.328 Thus, the price differential inducing 
acceptance of such agreements reflects a cost-based distinction 
between the two contracts and thereby entails voluntary 
integration. 329 
The proponent of the agreement may hope to achieve market 
power in the next period, and the premium it will charge for sales 
unencumbered by an exclusive dealing contract will reflect the 
expected value of that power. Still, this expectation may not be real-
ized. Moreover, the mere fact that a firm engages in certain conduct 
in the hope of achieving market power does not render that conduct 
an exercise of power that may never be achieved. For instance, a firm 
might construct a large factory, hoping to realize economies of scale, 
driving rivals from the market, and obtaining market power. 330 The 
firm might even pay a premium price for the inputs needed to con-
struct the factory, hoping to speed their delivery or preempt rivals. 331 
No one could assert, however, that the construction of the factory or 
payment of a premium constitutes an "exercise" ofmarket power anal-
326 See Hayek, supra note 85, at 110-16 (contending that well-functioning competi-
tive order depends upon properly-designed "legal framework" of contract, property, 
tort and business law). 
327 See supra Part III.C. 
328 See Coase, Problem of Social Cost, supra note 270, at 40-43 (contending that deci-
sion-makers take opportunity costs into account when evaluating the impact of alter-
native arrangements). 
329 See Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 59, at 146-48 & n.170 (contending 
that franchisees will not object to exclusionary rights contracts creating market power 
because franchisor will share the fruits of such power with them); Alan]. Meese, 
Exclusive Dealing, The Theory of the Firm, and Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward a New Synthesis, 
50 ANTITRUST BuLL. 371, 408-409 (2005) [hereinafter Meese, Exclusive Dealing] 
(explaining that RRC paradigm suggests that exclusive dealing contracts raising rivals' 
costs are purely voluntary). 
330 See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text (explaining that such conduct is 
lawful under § 2). 
331 Cf Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860 (W.D.N.Y. 
1994) (evaluating failed bidder's challenge to dominant firm's prevailing bid to 
purchase and merge with rival and thus allegedly fortifY market power). 
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ogous to output restriction and above-cost pricing. Indeed, courts 
and scholars who have distinguished between "competition on the 
merits," on the one hand, and the "use" or "exercise" of market power 
on the other have expressly held that the realization of economies of 
scale is the quintessential example of the former and beyond the 
scope of antitrust regulation.332 
To be sure, dealers or other parties may "prefer" not to be bound 
by such agreements, other things being equal.333 One might therefore 
say that such contracts are imposed against their "will."334 Indeed, this 
is the rationale for the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize the 
defense of in pari delicto in the supplier I dealer context. 335 Still, one 
could say the same thing about any number of agreements that bind 
dealers or others in subsequent periods. For instance, a franchisee 
that agrees to an exclusive territory may later wish to sell outside that 
territory.336 Or, a consumer who purchases a thirty-six-month war-
ranty may "prefer" a longer warranty when her car breaks down forty-
two months later. However, neither the franchisee nor the consumer 
paid for the terms they now desire, and the subsequent creation of 
new terms would simply countenance opportunistic behavior against 
the manufacturer or franchisor. 337 Here again, consideration of the 
entire contract-terms plus associated price-brings things into 
proper focus. 338 Enforcement of an exclusionary rights agreement is 
no more "coercive" than the enforcement of other garden-variety con-
tractual term. 
Far from being victims of coercion, input suppliers who are par-
ties to exclusionary rights agreements are best viewed as willing par-
332 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Easunan Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979) 
("A firm that has lawfully acquired a monopoly position is not barred from taking 
advantage of scale economies by constructing, for example, a large and efficient fac-
tory. These benefits are a consequence of size and not an exercise of power over the 
market."). 
333 See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968) 
(describing how dealers who reaped "enormous profits" from franchise opportunity 
nonetheless challenged portions of the franchise agreement). 
334 See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text. 
335 See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 140-41 & n.5 (contending that the plaintiff dealers 
would not voluntarily agree to restrictions preventing them from purchasing inputs 
from the cheapest source available at any given moment). 
336 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1978) 
(detailing dealer's decision to open new store in different city in contravention .of 
location clause). 
337 See WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 371 (observing 
that the desire to "have your cake (low price) and eat it too (no restrictions)" is incon-
sistent with the theory and practice of contract). 
338 See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text. 
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tlctpants who may benefit handsomely from a successful RRC 
strategy.339 Recall in this connection that dealers, for instance, receive 
a discount from the manufacturer for participating in the scheme. 
This discount compensates the dealer, who begins with the right to 
supply distribution services to any manufacturer, for conveying a por-
tion of that property right to the manufacturer orchestrating the RRC 
scheme. By paying dealers a premium for such rights, putative 
predators basically share expected monopoly profits. Indeed, it seems 
entirely possible that dealers, and not the predator, will reap most of 
the rewards from such agreements given that they, and not the 
predator, possess the initial right to exclude that forms the basis for 
the exclusionary rights strategy. This conclusion follows from a corol-
lary of the Coase Theorem: absent transaction costs, the initial alloca-
tion of a right has no impact on its ultimate allocation but does impact 
the distribution of income between parties that bargain over it. 340 
Indeed, in some cases, input suppliers might credibly threaten to 
"hold out," thwarting the scheme altogether or charging exorbitant 
prices for such exclusionary rights. 341 
Thus, it seems, participants in exclusionary rights agreements are 
analogous to participants in horizontal cartels who collectively set out-
put and divide the profits among themselves. 342 These carte lists, of 
course, are behaving in a purely voluntary manner, lured simply by 
the prospect of higher than normal profits.343 Participation in a rais-
ing rivals' costs scheme is equally voluntary and not the result of "coer-
cion."344 Moreover, unlike the market power model, this insight 
339 Cf Wiley, Prisoner's Dilemma, supra note 112, at 1906-07 (explaining that con-
sumer-harming cartels are the result of voluntary cooperation between rivals). 
340 See Coase, supra note 270, at 5 (explaining that initial allocation of entitle-
ments will impact the relative income of bargaining parties). 
341 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Competition and Cooperation in 
theMarketforExclusionaryRights, 76AMER. EcoN. REv. 109,111-12 (1986) (explaining 
how input suppliers might have incentive to "hold out" and thereby thwart raising 
rivals' costs scheme). 
342 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers and Buyers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1369, 1376-77 
(1991) (persuasivly contending that customers and suppliers can cooperate to create 
and share monopoly profits); Wiley, Prisoner's Dilemma, supra note 112, at 1906-07 
(explaining how participation in a cartel is generally voluntary). 
343 See Wiley, Prisoner's Dilemma, supra note 112, at 1906-07. 
344 See generally Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 59, at 146 (explaining how 
franchisees would eagerly cooperate in a successful raising rivals' cost scheme). See 
also Meese, Exclusive Dealing, supra note 329, at 409; Elhauge, supra note 9, at 340-41. 
It should be noted that Professor Elhauge's conclusion that dealers will not oppose 
certain raising rivals' costs schemes depends upon the (plausible) claim that collective 
action problems will thwart dealers' efforts to resist efforts by upstream firms to raise 
their rivals' costs. However, even if one assumes that dealers could overcome such 
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explains findings, such as those in Penna Life, that those bound by 
exclusionary rights agreements will enthusiastically participate in such 
schemes in pursuit of "enormous profits."345 While input suppliers 
may at some point resist enforcement of a particular exclusionary 
rights provision, such resistance does not suggest that such agree-
ments are coercive. Instead, such resistance suggests that dealers or 
other participants are trying to "have their cake and eat it too," i.e., 
reap the benefits (initial lower prices for the manufacturer's product 
and higher downstream prices) without any restriction on their auton-
omy. In the same way members of a cartel agree to reduce their 
respective levels of output and drive up price. Having done so, each 
cartelist has an individual incentive to secretly increase its output, so 
as to reap an undue share of the benefits of collusive output 
reduction. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST DoCTRINE 
The recognition that most plausible instances of non-standard 
contracts-whether beneficial or not-involve voluntary integration 
has significant implications for antitrust doctrine, as explained below. 
In particular, courts and the enforcement agencies should adjust all 
aspects of this doctrine so as to eliminate explicit or implicit reliance 
upon the notion that firms with market power "use" that power to 
impose non-standard agreements. The following subsections outline 
what direction such reform should take. 
A. Monopolization 
As explained earlier, significant § 2 decisions rest upon the pre-
mise that firms with monopoly power employ that power to coerce 
dealers and consumers to accept non-standard contracts such as tying 
and exclusive dealing agreements.346 Indeed, some courts have 
opined, albeit in dicta, that the existence of such agreements itself 
implies the presence of monopoly power.347 To be sure, modern 
courts allow defendants to offer justifications for such agreements, 
collective action problems, they may still voluntarily participate in a scheme whereby 
the manufacturer forces rivals to raise the prices they charge consumers, thereby con-
ferring market power on the manufacturer and its dealers. The manufacturer could 
then share this power with dealers by setting its price somewhere between the compet-
itive and monopolistic level, thereby ensuring that both manufacturer and dealers 
earn higher margins than before the scheme. 
345 See supra notes 61-64, and 333 and accompanying text. 
346 See supra Part I (summarizing these decisions). 
347 See supra notes 11, 185 and accompanying text. 
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thereby avoiding automatic condemnation. Still, the standards that 
courts employ when considering such justifications rest upon the 
implicit assumption that any such benefits coexist with some harm, 
apparently the exercise of power to impose the agreements in the first 
place.348 
Recognition that firms need not employ "power" to impose such 
agreements requires courts to revamp this test from the ground up. 
For one thing, the mere existence of an agreement does not suggest 
that the firm "imposing" it possesses market power. Moreover, proof 
that a monopolist has entered a non-standard agreement does not jus-
tify any presumption that the contract is the result of an "exercise" or 
"use" of such power or otherwise warrant a requirement that a defen-
dant offer evidence explaining or justifying such an agreement. 
Instead, courts should require plaintiffs to show that the challenged 
agreement actually produces economic harm by raising rivals' costs 
and thereby protecting or enhancing the monopolist's power over 
price. In so doing, plaintiffs should have to establish the several nec-
essary conditions for such a strategy to be successful.349 Absent such 
proof, any challenge to such agreements should fail. Moreover, if 
courts nonetheless allow such challenges to proceed, they should alter 
the manner in which they currently evaluate defendants' claims that 
such agreements produce benefits. In particular, courts should not 
assume that such benefits coexist with harms in the form of an "exer-
cise" of monopoly power employed to impose the agreement. 
Instead, proof that the restraint produces benefits should undermine 
entirely any presumption that a seller has "used" power to impose an 
agreement on unwilling purchasers or suppliers and thus itself end 
any case premised upon a claim that a defendant "used" power to 
impose such an agreement.350 
B. Tying 
Under current law, tying contracts are unlawful per se if the pro-
ponent of the agreement possesses economic power in the market for 
the tying product.351 The "per se" rule rests upon the assumption that 
firms with market power use that power to coercively force such agree-
348 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
349 See supra note 315 and accompanying text (collecting authorities detailing nec-
essary conditions for success of raising rivals' costs strategy). 
350 CJ. Meese, Rule of Reason, supra note 74, at 145-67 (explaining how proof that 
a restraint produces significant benefits undermines presumption arising under cur-
rent law that restraint produces anti-competitive effects). 
351 See supra Part I.B (articulating tying doctrine and its rationale). 
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ments on unwilling purchasers. At the same time, neither courts nor 
commentators who support the per se rule have offered any explana-
tion of how firms without market power obtain such agreements. 
While a few lower courts have allowed defendants to justify such agree-
ments, the standards governing such justifications rest upon the 
assumption that any benefits produced by such agreements necessarily 
coexist with the "harm" that courts irrebuttably presume once the 
plaintiff proves that proponents of the agreement possess market 
power.352 
The recognition that such agreements may well be examples of 
voluntary integration entirely undermines current law and the pre-
sumption of "coercive forcing" on which it rests. Many such agree-
ments reduce transaction costs and produce efficiencies, even if the 
proponent of the agreement possesses market power. Moreover, 
while firms might theoretically employ market power to impose such 
agreements, there is no reason to assume that they will in fact do so. 
As a result, courts should reject the per se rule against tying con-
tracts announced during the Harvard-inspired inhospitality era. Mere 
proof that a firm that obtains a tying contract possesses market power 
simply does not suffice to establish that the agreement produces 
anticompetitive harm. Instead, courts should analyze such contracts 
under the Rule of Reason, as they do with other agreements. In par-
ticular, courts should examine whether such agreements significantly 
raise the costs of the proponent's rivals by, for instance, depriving 
independent suppliers of substitutes for the tied product of sufficient 
scale to realize efficiencies. 353 Plaintiffs that cannot establish the nec-
essary conditions for a raising rivals' costs strategy should see their 
cases bounced out of court. Moreover, establishing these conditions 
would not entitle plaintiffs to judgment. Instead, such a prima facie 
case would simply shift the burden to the defendant to bring forward 
evidence that in fact, the restraint produced benefits by, for instance, 
reducing the costs of transacting. 
It should be emphasized that, under the approach offered here, 
market power over the tying product would not be a necessary condi-
tion for liability, either, as some jurist and scholars, particularly those 
associated with the Chicago School, have suggested. 354 Instead, as 
explained earlier, a firm with no preexisting market power can adopt 
352 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
353 See Meese, Antitrust Balancing, supra note 59, at 145-48 (describing how such a 
strategy could theoretically succeed in the franchising context) o 
354 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (collecting authorities contend-
ing that proof of preexisting market power should be a necessary condition for liabil-
ity under the Rule of Reason, including where tying contracts are concerned) 0 
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agreements that raise the rivals' costs and therefore create market 
power that did not previously exist.355 Thus, contrary to the sugges-
tions of some, the mere absence of market power in the tying product 
market should not preclude a plaintiff from establishing that the 
restraint produces harms greater than any offsetting benefits.356 In 
the same way, a plaintiff challenging an exclusive dealing agreement 
should not be required to show that the proponent of such an agree-
ment, say a manufacturer, possesses preexisting power over its prod-
uct market. 
C. In Pari Delicto 
At common law, plaintiffs who were parties to anticompetitive or 
otherwise illegal agreements were barred from challenging such con-
tracts on the grounds that plaintiffs were themselves equally at fault 
for the existence and enforcement of the agreement.357 However, 
more than four decades ago, the Supreme Court reversed course, 
holding that a plaintiff could challenge an agreement to which it was a 
party if the negotiation of the agreement was not voluntary, that is, if 
the defendant employed economic power to coerce or compel the 
plaintiff into entering the agreement. 358 In such cases, the Court said, 
plaintiffs should be perfectly free to challenge these agreements and 
recover whatever damages they might have suffered as a result of their 
enforcement.359 This exception to the in pari delicto doctrine quite 
obviously rested upon the assumption that defendants sometimes 
employ preexisting market power to coerce or force plaintiffs into 
entering agreements they otherwise would not have entered. The 
quintessential example of such purported coercion was a manufac-
turer's "use" of market power to "force" dealers to enter exclusive 
dealing or tying contracts.36o 
TCE undermines the economic premises that informed the 
"coercion" exception to the in pari delicto defense. In particular, pro-
ponents of TCE contend, and with good reason, that most non-stan-
dard agreements are purely voluntary methods of reducing the 
(transaction) costs of relying upon the market to conduct economic 
355 See supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text; see also Meese, Antitrust Balanc-
ing, supra note 59, at 145-48 (explaining how raising rivals' costs strategy can succeed 
in the franchising context despite absence of preexisting market power). 
356 See supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text. 
357 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
358 See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text. 
359 See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-41 (1968). 
360 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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activity. 361 In these circumstances, then, there is simply no basis for 
concluding that defendants have forced plaintiffs to enter such agree-
ments. One would hope, of course, that agreements that in fact 
reduce such costs would survive Rule of Reason scrutiny, thereby elim-
inating the necessity of any such defense in the first place. Nonethe-
less, even in this class of cases, the availability of such a defense to any 
challenge to non-standard agreements could reduce the cost of litiga-
tion by obviating the need for a fact-intensive analysis of such agree-
ments to determine whether, in fact, they produce more benefits than 
harms. 
To be sure, TCE does not teach that all non-standard agreements 
are methods of reducing transaction costs. Instead, the so-called "rais-
ing rivals' costs" school contends that such agreements can, in narrow 
circumstances, be methods of denying rivals access to reasonably-
priced inputs, thus raising those rivals' costs and conferring market 
power on the proponent of the agreement. 362 While such agreements 
may appear to be the result of market power, close analysis suggests 
that they are instead the result of purely voluntary integration, to wit, 
a process of contract formation whereby the proponent of the agree-
ment offers the input supplier a discount if it agrees to the exclusive 
arrangement, thereby sharing expected market power with the sup-
plier.363 Thus, such agreements are no more "coercive" than a gar-
den-variety cartel agreement, whereby rivals voluntarily decide to 
reduce output and thus collectively exercise market power. 
In the end, then, TCE, combined with raising rivals' costs theory, 
entirely undermines the economic premises that animate the "coer-
cion" exception to the in pari delicto defense. Moreover, the interpre-
tation of harmful agreements as purely voluntary suggests that failure 
to recognize such a defense may actually encourage the formation of 
such agreements in the first place. That is to say, input suppliers 
faced with the option of entering such agreements may view assent to 
such contracts as a "win win" situation.364 If the agreement "works 
out," in the sense of co~ferring shared market power on the parties, 
the supplier will prosper. If, on the other hand, the agreement does 
not confer marker power, or if the supplier believes that it has 
received an unfairly modest share of that power, the supplier can chal-
361 See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
362 See supra notes 309-29 and accompanying text. 
363 See supra Part III.C. 
364 See Alan J. Meese, Property, Aspen, and Refusals to Deal, 73 ANTITRUST LJ. 81 
(2005). 
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lenge the agreement in court, hoping at least to obtain some damages 
(or a settlement) to compensate it for any loss it has suffered. 
None of this is to say that courts should necessarily invoke the 
defense to bar any and all actions challenging contracts a party has 
entered. There may well be other reasons for allowing such actions, 
even if a plaintiff voluntarily entered an agreement. The argument 
here is much narrower, viz., that courts should not premise a rejection 
of the in pari delicto defense upon an assumption that plaintiffs 
entered such agreements involuntarily. 
CoNCLUSION 
Several antitrust doctrines rest upon a "market power" model of 
contract formation, i.e., the assumption that firms employ preexisting 
economic power to coerce dealers and consumers to enter non-stan-
dard agreements. This Article has shown that the "market power" 
model derives from neoclassical price theory and its workable compe-
tition model, both of which heavily influenced antitrust law and schol-
arship during antitrust's inhospitality era. Application of the 
workable competition model in particular led scholars and courts to 
conclude that non-standard agreements produced no benefits and 
that firms used preexisting market power to impose them. 
More recently, transaction cost economics has emerged as a com-
petitor to workable competition as a method of explaining the origin 
and impact of non-standard agreements. TCE concludes that such 
agreements are presumptively methods of voluntarily rearranging 
property rights and thus reducing the cost of transacting, that is, rely-
ing upon the private market to conduct economic activity. Such con-
tracts are not "imposed" on dealers or consumers, but are instead the 
result of purely voluntarily bargaining, whereby proponents of such 
agreements offer dealers and consumers cost-justified discounts to 
induce them to assent to non-standard provisions. 
· TCE does not deny that some non-standard agreements can be 
anti-competitive. Still, even agreements that raise rivals' costs and 
confer market power on their proponents are the result of purely vol-
untary contractual integration that rearranges property rights to 
achieve this result. Thus, there is simply no reason to premise any 
antitrust tests upon a search for a "use" of monopoly or market power 
to "impose" such agreements on unwilling purchasers. Courts that in 
fact articulate and apply such tests are looking for a phenomenon that 
does not exist, at least in any sense relevant to the antitrust laws. Doc-
trines that rest upon the "market power" model of contract formation 
must be discarded. 
